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In Latin America due importance has not 
been attached to the problems deriving 
from population growth, and although it 
is not a matter of promoting a new 
malthusianism, attention should be drawn 
to the challenges with which the coun-
tries of the region will be faced if current 
population trends continue in the next 
few decades. Suffice it to point out that 
should this happen, Latin America would 
have more than 700 million inhabitants 
by the end of the century and over 6 000 
million in a hundred years' time; that is, 
its population would be 20 times as big as 
at present, and one and half times as large 
as the entire population of the world today. 
The present article explores some 
aspects of this process in relation to the 
continent as a whole and at the national 
and regional levels in four specially selec-
ted countries (Argentina, Brazil, El Salva-
dor and Venezuela). In the light of several 
population projections, constructed on 
the basis of various growth hypotheses, it 
analyses general demographic trends (fer-
tility, mortality, population growth) and 
changes in the age composition and in the 
structure of the labour force. In this last 
connexion, the author stresses the point 
that the great increase in the active-age 
population will exert tremendous pressure 
on the labour market during the coming 
decades, with the consequent economic, 
social and political repercussions. 
•Economic Development Division, CEPAL 
Introduction 
In the course of work on a general simu-
lation model designed to experiment 
with a variety of possible development 
styles it became clear that employment 
is likely to remain one of the major 
problems facing the Latin American 
economy throughout the remainder of 
this century, if not longer. Given the 
importance of this question a separate 
population model was set up to investi-
gate population and labour force trends. 
A set of simulation exercises was 
designed for the analysis of four coun-
tries, selected to show the range of 
variation in the region. The present 
paper reports the principal results of 
these exercises. 
To place the exercise in proper 
perspective the analysis begins with a 
general discussion of the population 
parameters which characterize the 
region. Although well-known to demo-
graphers, it is probable that many of 
these, and their implications, are less 
familiar to economists and other specia-
lists concerned with development pro-
blems, and in view of their often 
fundamental importance can bear 
repeating. 
The first point to stress is that 
population is a long-term variable per se, 
and changes in the basic parameters 
require very long periods to work them-
selves out. Thus, even on the extreme 
assumption that age-specific fertility 
rates drop sharply for 25 years, to a level 
which implies zero population growth in 
a stable population, the population 
would still continue to increase rapidly 
for a much longer period; for the region 
as a whole, half a century would pass 
before the rate of population increase 
approached the present-day Western 
European level, and growth would 
actually stop only after about 100 years. 
From about 275 million in 1970 the 
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population of the region would rise to 
well over 500 million at the end of this 
century and to about 800 million by the 
time the expansion eventually stopped 
The practical importance of such a mini-
mum projection lies in that it shows 
quite clearly that the concept of Latin 
America as an under-populated region, 
with abundant land and other resources 
in relation to its population, corresponds 
to a transitory phenomenon only; in 
most countries this phase will have 
passed in less than 50 years' time. 
At the other extreme, if birth rates 
are held at their 1970 level for a prolonged 
period, imagination boggles at the 
projected population figures: after 100 
years the population of a small country 
such as El Salvador would number over 
150 million, Brazil's more than 2 000 
million, and that of the region as a whole 
over 6 000 million -half as large again as 
the present population of the entire 
world. The question is not whether this 
will happen, but rather how and how 
soon changes will occur which will bring 
down population growth to more mana-
geable proportions. 
The Latin American population is in 
genera! a very young one, but age 
structures vary substantially from one 
area to another and this has major impli-
cations for the size and growth rate of 
the labour force, the size of the depen-
dent population, educational require-
ments, etc. An analysis of these aspects 
is undertaken, and again the very long-
range projections show how age struc-
tures might change in extreme cases. 
There are three major underlying 
population parameters which need to be 
estimated for use in the simulation exer-
cises: fertility rates, death rates, and the 
pattern of internal migration. The 
greatest interest is probably in fertility 
rates, and the range is very wide: in 1970 
the total fertility rate is estimated to 
have varied from around 2.3 in the urban 
south of Argentina to over 7 in various 
rural areas. This of course implies major 
differences in both the rate of increase 
and the structure of the population from 
one area to another. One of the more 
important conclusions to be drawn from 
the study must indeed be that, with 
respect to population parameters and 
trends, there is an impressive range of 
variation within Latin America. 
On the basis of these estimates of 
the situation in 1970, and using specific 
assumptions about future changes, a 
number of simulation exercises were 
then carried out, covering the 30-year 
period to the end of the century. A 
similar set of exercises was conducted 
for each of the four countries studied, 
showing what would occur in the event 
of little change in the population para-
meters, moderate change, great change, a 
continuing shift to the cities, a relative 
retention of population in the rural 
areas, etc. 
The aggregate population increases 
which can be expected are reasonably 
familiar. Even if it is assumed that age-
specific fertility rates fall steadily and 
sharply, the annual rate of population 
growth declines only slowly and remains 
around 2 per cent at the end of the 
century in most countries; if more mode-
rate decreases in fertility rates are 
assumed, the population will still be 
increasing at that date at rates of 2.5 per 
cent to over 3 per cent per annum. The 
end-of-the-century population in most 
countries can be expected to be more 
than twice as large as in 1970. 
The two broadest economic issues 
here are the implications for per capita 
resource availabilities and the potential 
size of the market. With respect to the 
first, even with the rapid population 
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increase which will occur the region as a 
whole will not be particularly densely 
populated at the end of the century. But 
the resource base will have become much 
less generous than it has been customary 
to assume: from the early post-World 
War II period to the end of the century 
the population will have multiplied 
about fourfold, and so the per capita 
resource base will have been cut by 
three-quarters in half a century. As 
regards markets, it is clear that in the 
region as a whole the number of poten-
tial consumers will be more than suffi-
cient to support even those modern 
industries with very large economies of 
scale. The more relevant question here is 
the extent to which the population can 
be integrated into the production 
process so as to provide real money 
demand for such products. 
There are striking variations from 
one country to another in these general 
respects, however, and these differences 
are specified in the analysis. 
In addition to the magnitude of the 
total population increase it is of major 
importance to determine where it is 
likely to occur. In part this will depend 
on existing population patterns —and 
here again there is a very wide range of 
variation- but it also depends on future 
internal migration flows, which add an 
important element of uncertainty to 
future trends. 
At one extreme there are areas 
which were already largely urban in 
1970 and where the bulk of the future 
population increase will occur in the 
cities, even if little more rural-urban 
migration takes place. In such areas 
facilities required for the growing popu-
lation will have to be provided mainly in 
the urban centres, where infrastructure 
costs are likely to be relatively high. 
Other major implications are linked to 
the fact that the population shift from 
the rural to the urban areas has basically 
already occurred. The impact on the 
cities of continuing rural migration will 
be relatively slight, and the increase in 
the urban population will depend prima-
rily on fertility rates in the cities 
themselves. The nature of the urban 
population will gradually change; recent 
migrants will become a steadily smaller 
proportion of the total, with important 
economic, social and political conse-
quences. What is perhaps of greatest 
importance is that since the period of 
most rapid urban population growth, 
linked to migration, is past, the cities can 
be expected to expand less rapidly in the 
future, and pressures for urban employ-
ment, housing, social services, etc., 
should therefore be easier to accommo-
date. At the same time the rural 
population will already have been 
reduced to a minority of the total, and 
so the problem of rural poverty will also 
be easier to deal with. 
At the other extreme are those 
areas where the bulk of the population is 
still rural. Here the extent to which 
migration takes place is a central factor, 
and will determine where most of the 
population increase occurs. The poten-
tial transition to a chiefly urban popula-
tion remains in the future. Large-scale 
migration could produce such a transi-
tion, and bring with it very high rates of 
increase in the urban population and 
consequent pressures for employment, 
social services, etc. At the same time, 
since the population will still be mainly 
rural, the problem of rural poverty will 
be especially difficult to tackle. 
In addition to the rural-urban division, 
similar considerations can be applied to 
different regions within a country, and 
an analysis of this sort is undertaken in 
the cases of Argentina and Brazil. 
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Significant changes in the age struc-
ture may well take place by the end of 
the century, but the population will 
remain a relatively young one in most 
areas. The changes which occur will 
depend primarily on how much fertility 
rates decline, but also to some extent on 
internal migration flows. If birth rates 
decline substantially there will be a 
considerable reduction in the relative 
importance of the dependent popula-
tion, which is composed largely of 
children in most areas (except in 
Argentina, the elderly dependent group 
will remain quite small until after the 
turn of the century). This would mean a 
sharp fall in the growth rate of the 
school-age population in many areas and 
so make adequate educational facilities 
easier to provide. 
The age group which will increase 
most rapidly is the young adult group, 
and this has significant implications both 
for the growth of the labour force and 
for the number of births at any parti-
cular level of age-specific fertility rates. 
If fertility rates decrease substantially, by 
the end of the century there will be a sharp 
upswing in the relative importance of the 
young adult age group in most countries. 
In all these respects great diffe-
rences are observable from one area to 
another. In general the proportion of 
children is much higher and the propor-
tion of active adults much lower in the 
rural areas than in the cities, a fact which 
carries major economic and social impli-
cations. As these disparities are partly 
the result of rural-urban migration (it is 
primarily the very young who migrate), 
future migration flows may be a conti-
nuing influence here. There are also 
significant differences among regions and 
at the national level. 
On the basis of assumptions about 
labour participation rates, possible 
trends in the dimensions of the labour 
force are obtained. In most countries it 
is likely to increase at annual rates of 3 
per cent or higher for several decades at 
least, attaining by the end of the century 
2lÁ to 23/4 times its 1970 size. The 
near-certainty of this conclusion is 
shown clearly by the simulation exer-
cises; despite the diversity of the under-
lying assumptions, the projections do 
not differ greatly from one exercise to 
another. Although the magnitude of the 
discrepancy varies, the increase in the 
labour force is nearly always a good deal 
larger than the increase in the population 
as a whole. 
These growth rates are very high, 
and will represent a vital challenge to the 
modern-type industrial development 
process which characterizes the econo-
mies of the region. Historically, during 
the phase of industrial development in 
the now highly industrialized countries 
the labour force was increasing much 
more slowly, and even so the employ-
ment problem was for long periods often 
critical 
The relatively high rates of increase 
are a comparatively recent phenomenon, 
and partly account for the heightened 
concern with the problem of adequate 
employment opportunities in recent 
years. Furthermore, owing to the age 
structure of the population, these rates 
are only now reaching their peak in some 
countries, and cannot be expected to 
decline much until at earliest the last 
decade or so of the century. 
Trends in labour participation rates 
may be an important factor in some 
areas. In particular, female participation 
rates are often quite low, and if they 
should rise toward Western European 
levels would significantly affect the 
overall expansion of the labour force. Its 
composition, both by age and by sex, 
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might be influenced to a considerably 
greater extent 
Again the question arises of where 
the increase in the labour force will be 
concentrated, and this is discussed in 
terms similar to those already noted with 
respect to the population as a whole. 
The population exercises described here 
are quite simple in concept, do not 
pretend to observe the analytical rigour 
required by professional demographers, 
and are not intended for that audience. 
Estimates of all variables were made on 
the basis of the best data available at the 
time, but some of these must be regar-
ded as only very approximate. Still, an 
effort has been made to deal with a 
number of the key determinants of 
population and the labour force, and 
although often results cannot be speci-
fied with precision they are likely to be 
of some interest to economists and 
others concerned with the role of popu-
lation and the labour force in the 
development process. 
Four countries were selected for 
the exercises with the aim of giving some 
idea of the range of variation throughout 
the region: Argentina, a highly urbanized 
country with a relatively low rate of 
population growth; Venezuela, a highly 
urbanized country with a high rate of 
population growth; Brazil, with an ave-
rage degree of urbanization and a 
moderately high (and also average for 
the region) rate of population growth; 
and El Salvador, a country which 
remains mostly rural and has a high rate 
of population growth. 
The situation in the urban areas is of 
particular interest here, as the problem 
of employment tends to be more urgent 
in these areas. 
All the foregoing aspects of the 
problem, plus others, are analysed more 
fully in the following pages. 
(a) Total population trends 
The simulation exercises reported on 
here are basically concerned with the 
30-year period 1970-2000. This is 
already a period of such length that 
nearly all variables can change conside-
rably, and for most purposes there is 
little point in considering longer inter-
vals. Population trends/ however, are 
perhaps the long-term variable par 
excellence. The underlying parameters 
often change relatively slowly, and even 
when they do change can take a long 
time to work themselves out through the 
population structure. The aggregate 
population was therefore first projected 
for a 100-year period on each of two 
extreme hypotheses. This projection 
shows the limits within which popu-
lation movements are likely to lie, and 
serves as a general framework within 
which to orient the analysis, which is 
thereafter restricted to the 1970-2000 
period. 
The limiting hypotheses refer to age-
specific fertility rates. In one case the 
projection shows what would occur if 
fertility rates remained at about the 
1970 levels. In the other, it is postulated 
that the age-specific fertility rates decline 
steadily and rapidly for 25 years, by 
1. 
General population trends and structures 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION GROWTH IN SELECTED COUNTRIES ON 
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aFertility rates decline to the point where the gross reproduction rate is 2.2. In a stable 
population with the death rates which are expected to prevail in Latin America at the end of this 
century (and which are maintained in the projection) this results in approximately zero population 
growth. 
^The figures are for the 20 republics. An independent projection was not made for the 
regional total: the figures are estimates assuming that the population of Brazil remains a constant 
proportion of the whole. 
which time (1995) they reach a level 
which implies approximately zero popu-
lation growth in a stable population, and 
then remain unchanged. Both hypothe-
ses are extreme. There will almost 
certainly be future decreases in fertility 
rates, which are now often very high, in 
most countries; and it is highly unlikely 
that within 25 years fertility rates will 
decline to the level consistent with zero 
population growth. Nevertheless, this 
does set limits, and these, particularly 
the lower one, are of some importance, 
specifically when dealing with the proba-
ble size of the labour force during the 
coming decades. 
The results of these projections are 
presented in table 1, showing, for the 
limiting hypotheses, population growth 
rates and population size in absolute 
terms at intervals over the 100-year 
period. 
For practical purposes the infor-
mation provided by the minimum 
projection is of greater interest. 
Although in this projection fertility rates 
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in all countries have already fallen by the 
end of the century to a level consistent 
with zero growth in a stable population, 
the population is in fact still increasing 
at an annual rate of about 1.3 per cent in 
the region as a whole, and at higher rates 
in some countries. Even in the year 
2035, when fertility rates have been at 
the zero growth level for fully 40 years, 
the population continues to increase at 
0.5 per cent per annum. That is, even on 
this minimum hypothesis well over half a 
century would pass before the rate of 
population increase declined to the 
present-day Western European level, and 
about 100 years before the population 
became stable and growth actually 
stopped. 
During this period the size of the 
population would expand substantially. 
Even with the very rapid decline in ferti-
lity rates assumed, the population of 
countries such as El Salvador or Vene-
zuela would double by the end of the 
century, Brazil's would exceed 175 
million, and that of the region as a whole 
would be well above 500 million. When 
stability was eventually reached, a small 
country such as El Salvador would have 
a population of well over 10 million, 
Venezuela over 35 million (similar to 
that of Argentina), Brazil about 265 
million (similar to the 1970 population 
of the entire region), and Latin America 
in toto nearly 800 million. 
The practical importance of this pro-
jection is that it shows quite clearly that 
the concept of Latin America as an 
under-populated region, with abundant 
land and other resources in relation to its 
population, corresponds only to a transi-
tory phenomenon. Even on an extreme 
hypothesis regarding the decline in ferti-
lity rates the population of the region 
will continue to grow rapidly for a 
lengthy period, and when it becomes sta-
bilized will be nearly triple the 1970 
population. The phase of under-
population and relatively abundant 
resources will have passed in most 
countries in less than 50 years' time. 
Long-term planning in the region will 
have to be oriented more in this direc-
tion. Land and other resources will 
become increasingly scarce - a minimum 
of around 800 million people will have 
to be provided for— and increasing atten-
tion will have to be given to the 
husbanding of these resources. This is 
likely to have major implications for a 
wide range of problems: patterns of 
urbanization and land settlement, natu-
ral resource extraction rates and export 
policy, agricultural development pro-
grammes, etc. It should be emphasized 
that no programme of family planning, 
or autonomous change, can reasonably 
be expected to alter this situation. The 
projection is a minimum one, assuming a 
sharp and rapid decline in fertility rates, 
and the real question is likely to be how 
far above this minimum the actual trend 
will lie. 
The maximum projection is of 
interest less as a real possibility than as 
an illustration of the implausibility of 
things remaining as they are for a long 
period. If fertility rates were to remain 
at their 1970 level the population of the 
region would exceed 700 million at the 
end of the century. This is 35 per cent 
more than on the minimum hypothesis, 
but is still not an impossible difference, 
and again indicates the very long-term 
and slowly changing nature of popula-
t ion trends. Even with extreme 
hypotheses the results differ only mode-
rately at first; it is only after several 
decades that the divergence begins to be 
striking and finally reaches enormous 
proportions. Should fertility rates conti-
nue at the 1970 level for 100 years (with 
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death rates unchanging at the levels 
expected in the year 2000) the popula-
tion of a small country such as El 
Salvador would increase to over 150 
million people, Brazil's would number 
more than 2 billion, and that of the 
region as a whole would be over 6 billion 
-half as large again as the present popu-
lation of the entire world. The imagina-
tion boggles at such figures. The 
question is not whether this will happen, 
but rather how and how soon changes 
will occur which will bring population 
growth down to more manageable 
proportions. 
(b) Age structures at the national level 
To return to the minimum projec-
tion, it is of interest to note not only the 
changes in the totals, but also the shifts 
in the age structure which occur. As was 
noted above, the population continues 
to increase fairly rapidly for some time 
after fertility rates have declined to the 
zero growth level (in a stable popula-
tion), and this is due to the age struc-
ture. The age structure also has major 
implications for the size and rate of 
growth of the labour force, the size of 
the dependent population, educational 
requirements, etc. 
The youthfulness of the Latin Ame-
rican population has been widely comen-
ted on, but some of the implications are 
probably less generally known among 
non-specialists, particularly when they 
relate to changes over time; and they are 
of considerable importance. The major 
factor determining the age structure, as 
well as the total rate of increase, is the 
fertility rate; but death rates can also 
have an important influence, and the 
impact of these two vital rates tends to 
be of a similar sort. 
Birth rates obviously determine the 
size of the infant population, and 
changes in fertility rates affect the relative 
size of this group and hence the age 
structure. Less obviously, a large propor-
tion of total deaths also occur among the 
very young. In the late 1960s 40 per 
cent or more of all deaths in the region 
probably occurred among children under 
5 years of age,1 and the percentage was 
probably even higher in earlier years. 
Most of these child deaths, in turn, take 
place among infants of less than one 
year. This situation is a reflection both 
of the age structure of the population, 
and of the high child mortality rates which 
are often encountered, especially before 
death rates begin to fall substantially. 
Thus changes in mortality rates tend 
to have a concentrated impact on the 
very young, and to affect the age struc-
ture in much the same way as changes in 
the fertility rate. In either case it is first 
the size, and hence .the relative impor-
tance, of the youngest age group which 
is affected. With time this initial impact 
then surges up through the age structure 
like a wave. 
It is useful to illustrate the varia-
tions which these kinds of influences 
have already produced in the region, and 
the extremes possible on the maximum 
and minimum hypotheses of the projec-
tions. Table 2 shows the age structure in 
the four countries dealt with in the 
projections. 
1
 There is considerable variation among 
countries. In Uruguay and Argentina the figure 
was only about 15 per cent, while in a few 
countries it was over 50 per cent. There was 
some concentration around 45 per cent, 
however, and this included several of the most 
populous countries. For purposes of compa-
rison it may be noted that the proportion in 
Canada and the United States was approximately 
5 per cent. 
POPULATION AND THE LABOUR FORCE IN LATIN AMERICA / Charles Rollins 135 
Table 2 









































0 - 4 
5 - 1 4 
1 5 - 19 
20-39 
40 -65 
65 and over 
aThe figures show the percentage of the total population of the country included in each age 
group. 
t>The minimum projection eventually results in an approximately stable population in each 
country and the age distribution is essentially the same in each case. 
In Argentina both fertility and death 
rates have for some time been lower than 
in most of the region and this has 
already resulted in a distinctly different 
age structure. Structures in the other 
countries shown, while varying some-
what, are more similar. The differences 
are concentrated at the two ends of the 
age structure. Children (those less than 
15 years of age) are a markedly smaller 
proportion of the population in Argen-
tina: 29.1 per cent of the total. At the 
other end of the range, children account 
for 47.5 per cent of the population of El 
Salvador. Adolescents and young adults 
(the 15-39 age groups) represent sur-
prisingly similar proportions of the 
population, and the compensating diffe-
rences are concentrated in the older age 
groups. In Argentina 33.4 per cent of the 
population is 40 or more years of age, 
while in El Salvador the corresponding 
figure is only 16.9 per cent. 
The projections using the maximum 
hypothesis (unchanging age-specific ferti-
lity rates) yield age structures in 2070 
similar to those of 1970 in the respective 
countries, and are not reproduced in the 
table. The projections with the minimum 
hypothesis of eventual zero population 
growth, however, result in a quite diffe-
rent age structure —essentially the same 
for each country- and this is shown in 
the table. The differences are of the 
same sort already occurring between the 
countries in 1970, but more marked. 
Children plus adolescents account for 
only about 28 per cent of the total in a 
stable population, young adults about 27 
per cent, and the older age groups about 
45 per cent. To take the most extreme 
comparison, in El Salvador the propor-
tion of children and adolescents would 
decline from 58 per cent of the popula-
tion in 1970 to 28 per cent, while that 
of the 40-plus age group would increase 
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from 17 per cent to 45 per cent; the 
percentage of young adults would not 
change much. 
These different age structures have 
numerous important implications. The 
dependent population (those under 15 
and over 65) represented only 36.3 per 
cent of the population in Argentina in 
1970, whereas the corresponding propor-
tion ranged up to 50.6 per cent in El 
Salvador. Even with similar productivity 
levels per member of the working popu-
lation, this would mean that per capita 
incomes would be higher in Argentina. 
Also, the school-age population is rela-
tively much smaller in Argentina and so 
educational costs are less demanding. In 
an eventually stable population the 
dependent population would be of the 
same relative importance as in Argentina 
in 1970, but its composition would be 
quite different: there would be relatively 
fewer children and more retired persons, 
with the consequent social and economic 
implications. 
The most active working-age popula-
tion was approx imately evenly split 
between the younger and older age 
groups in Argentina in 1970, whereas in 
El Salvador the younger group outnum-
bered the older by nearly two to one. 
Thus in Argentina the proportion of 
experienced workers was much greater 
than in the other three countries, with 
the various consequences which this 
might bring.2 Again the age structure in 
a stable population is in this respect 
more similar to the 1970 situation in 
2
 As is shown later, the age structure of the 
labour force itself varies from the age structure 
of the population owing to differing labour 
participation rates. The data therefore provide 
only an approximate idea of the labour force 
distribution. 
Argentina - b u t with a significant further 
shift toward the older and more 
experienced part of the working-age 
population. 
Other implications of the differences 
in age structures will be presented as the 
points of main interest in this analysis 
require. 
The 1970 age structures presented in 
table 2 are already the result of changes 
over time in the different countries, and 
as these changes have important implica-
tions for some aspects of the following 
discussion they too need to be noted. 
The type of change which has occurred 
in recent decades, and its extent, are 
illustrated in the figures for Venezuela 
given in table 3. 
As shown, the relative size of the 
child population has increased substan-
tially in recent decades: from 41 per 
cent of the total in 1936 to 46.8 per 
cent in 1970, with most of the increase 
occurring in a single decade, i.e., the 
1950s. This again illustrates how the 
initial impact of changes in the under-
lying vital statistics tends to be concen-
trated on the youngest age group. There 
was some increase in fertility rates, 
probably the result of improved health 
conditions, but the fall in mortality rates 
seems to have been more important, and 
this too had its most concentrated effect 
on the very young. 
It is the infant population (children 
under 5 years of age) which first begins 
to increase in relative importance 
-during the 1940s and 1950s this group 
grew sharply in relative size. Then in the 
mid-1960s fertility rates started to 
decline, so that the relative importance 
of the infant population in 1970 fell 
from its earlier peak, while the upward 
surge of the 1940s and 1950s was 
beginning to work its way through the 
ag e st rue ture. During the 1950s and 
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1960s the 5-14 year group increased 
rapidly in relative importance, and in the 
1960s the adolescent population was 
similarly affected. But the surge is only 
just reaching the adult population 
groups, which have therefore continued 
to decline in relative importance. 
Again there are numerous implica-
tions which follow from these changes. In 
the 1950s and 1960s the rapidly expand-
ing primary school population can be 
expected to have exerted increasing pres-
sure on the educational system. By the 
1960s this pressure will have spread to the 
secondary and university level. 
Of the impacts only just making 
themselves felt, one is of particular 
importance from the present point of 
view. The surge is barely starting to enter 
the age groups which make up the labour 
force. In the 1960s an upswing in the 
number of new entrants to the labour 
force can be presumed, which will result 
in pressures for additional employment 
that are likely to continue for some 
years to come. 
A second consequence worth noting 
is that the surge is also just beginning to 
penetrate into the child-bearing age 
groups, and this will have a marked 
effect on total births in coming years, 
quite apart from the trend in age-specific 
fertility rates. 
The sequence shown for Venezuela 
can be regarded as fairly normal, 
although the changes are sharper than 
those which have occurred in some coun-
tries. First, an improvement in health 
conditions leads to a rapid increase in 
the size of the infant population, largely 
as a result of the fall in infant mortality 
rates, but also to some extent through a 
possible rise in fertility rates. The 
upsurge will then begin to work its way 
through the age structure. Finally, at 
some point fertility rates may decrease 
and counteract this tendency towards 
increase. 
Table 3 
VENEZUELA: AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION IN 
RECENT DECADES3 
Age group ¡936 1941 1950 i960 1970 
0 - 4 
5 - 14 
15 - 19 
20-39 
40-65 































aThe 1950 to 1970 figures are from the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE) . 
Those for 1936 and 1941 are census data approximately adjusted so as to be directly comparable 
with the CELADE figures. 
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In the greater part of Latin America 
the strong downward movement in death 
rates appears to have begun in the 1940s, 
while trends in fertility rates have been 
more varied. Of the countries considered 
here Argentina is the one in which ferti-
lity rates seem always to have been lower 
than in most countries in the region, and 
have been declining gradually for some 
time. In Brazil fertility rates have also 
been somewhat lower than in a number 
of countries -although well above 
Argentina's level- and during the 1950s 
and 1960s they fell slightly. Fertility 
rates in Venezuela have been high, and 
began to decrease significantly only in 
the mid-1960s. In El Salvador, too, they 
have been high, and by the end of 1970 
had not shown any marked downturn. 
The tendency for a substantial drop 
in mortality rates to occur well ahead of 
any compensating change in fertility 
rates, which also results in a speeding-up 
of the rate of population growth, has 
been more widely commented on. But it 
is worth repeating the figures for the 
region as a whole to emphasize the 
magnitude of the change. In recent 
decades, the average annual rates of 
population growth in Latin America 
were as follows: 
1920-1930 1.9 per cent 
1930-1940 1.9 per cent 
1940-1950 2.4 per cent 
1950-1960 2.8 per cent 
1960-1970 2.8 per cent 
As observed above, it was in the 1940s 
that falling mortality rates introduced a 
pronounced change, and the process 
continued apace through the 1950s. In 
those two decades the annual rate of 
population increase rose by nearly half. 
The 1960s was a period of transition: 
the rate of increase was stabilized at a 
high level, as a result of offsetting trends 
in different countries. The current 
expectation is of a decline, due to falling 
fertility rates; but it seems improbable 
that, for the region as a whole, the rates 
of population growth of the 1920s and 
1930s will again prevail in this century. 
(c) Labour force trends 
It is very important to keep in mind 
that the changes which brought about 
this speeding-up of the rate of popula-
tion growth caused an accompanying 
shift in the age structure of the popula-
tion. To date it has meant primarily an 
increase in the number of children and 
adolescents, but in coming years the 
upsurge will work its way through the 
rest of the age structure. There is one 
aspect of this process which is of 
special interest here and needs to be 
explicitly considered: the implications 
for the labour force and so for employ-
ment prospects. 
Table 4 shows, for each of the four 
countries considered, how fast a hypo-
thetical labour force has grown since 
1950 and might grow in the future. The 
labour force is hypothetical as it is 
assumed that no change occurs in labour 
participation rates. The figures thus 
illustrate how the labour force is affec-
ted by population growth and changes 
in the age structure alone.3 Up to 
1970 the population figures are those of 
CELADE. From 1970 on they are the 
figures which result from the minimum 
projection, which assumes that fertility 
rates decline to the eventual zero growth 
level in 1995. This minimum projection 
3
 Possible effects of changes in labour parti-
cipation rates are considered in the simulation 
exercises discussed later; but it is useful first to 
emphasize the tendency of basic underlying 
population changes. 
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Table 4 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: HYPOTHETICAL ANNUAL GROWTH 






































































aThe rates of increase shown are those which would result.if no changes in labour participa-
tion rates occurred. A fixed set of labour participation rates by age group -the ILO estimates for 
1960 for each country- are applied to the population figures for each year. Up to the end of 1970 
the population figures are the CELADE estimates. After 1970 they are the figures which result 
from the minimum-hypothesis projections. In both cases they exclude international migration. 
is of greater interest as it shows the 
lowest rate of increase in the labour 
force which must be anticipated -and, 
as can be seen, even this rate will remain 
high for some time. 
The figures in table 4 give, again, a 
rather different picture for Argentina 
than for the other countries considered. 
At the beginning of the period shown 
the labour force was already growing less 
rapidly in Argentina than elsewhere, and 
this divergence became steadily greater 
through the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Whereas in Argentina the rate of increase 
declined from the level of the early 
1950s, in the other countries it rose 
substantially. 
The problem of employment has not 
been of the same serious nature in 
Argentina as in some countries of the 
region, despite the fact that the rate of 
economic growth during the 1950s and 
1960s was relatively low, and that the 
population was very largely urban, 
conditions which tend to make employ-
ment problems more conspicuous. A 
major factor keeping the employment 
problem under reasonable control in 
such circumstances was undoubtedly this 
tendency for the labour force to increase 
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at a more moderate rate. If the trend in 
Argentina had been similar to that 
shown in the other countries the situa-
tion would have been much more 
serious. 
But Argentina is an exception, and 
the other countries are more typical of 
what has occurred in the region as a 
whole. There are two aspects of the 
labour force trends in these countries 
which are of particular interest here. 
First, there has been a steady rise in the 
growth rate of the labour force over the 
past two decades. The rise was sharper in 
Venezuela and El Salvador than in 
Brazil, but it was considerable in each 
country. Furthermore, the rates of 
increase in the early 1950s were no 
doubt already well above those of earlier 
decades. This speeding-up of the growth 
of the labour force reflects, with some 
lag, changes in population growth rates. 
As discussed earlier, the substantial de-
cline in death rates, with its impact on 
population growth, generally started 
around 1940, and presumably began to 
be more fully reflected in labour force 
changes toward the end of the 1940s. 
During the 1920s and 1930s this hypo-
thetical labour force was probably 
increasing at only slightly over 2 per cent 
per annum in Brazil and Venezuela and 
at less than that rate in El Salvador. 
So marked an acceleration of the 
annual growth rate of the labour force in 
recent decades —from around 2 per cent 
to 3 per cent or more in most countries-
has undoubtedly been a major factor 
behind the mounting awareness of the 
lack of adequate employment opportu-
nities. This factor alone could often 
create difficulties: an economic structure 
capable of absorbing an annual 2 per 
cent increase in the labour force could 
become more and more inadequate in 
this respect as the annual increments 
rose to half as much again. There are 
of course other important factors: 
increasing urbanization, making employ-
ment problems more visible; changes in 
the industrial structure toward more 
capital-intensive and labour-saving tech-
niques; etc. But it is important to bear in 
mind that the basic underlying popula-
tion variables have changed in such a 
way as themselves to make the employ-
ment problem a great deal more difficult 
to cope with in recent years. 
The second aspect of these labour 
force trends which is important here is 
that this pressure can be expected to 
continue for some time, and even on 
occasion to be intensified during the 
1970s and 1980s. As shown in table 4, 
given the assumptions used, the rate of 
increase in the labour force climbs to its 
peak in Brazil in the last half of the 
1960s and the first half of the 1970s; 
while in Venezuela and El Salvador the 
peak -in each case considerably higher 
than in Brazil— is reached only during 
the 1970s. 
From the 1980s on the rates of 
increase gradually decline, but it will be 
recalled that this is on the basis of a 
projection which assumes a rapid fall in 
fertility rates, eventually to zero growth 
level in 1995. Even on this extreme 
hypothesis, the labour force continues to 
grow rapidly throughout the 1970s and 
1980s; while at the end of the century 
the annual rate of increase is still 2.8 per 
cent in Venezuela and 2.6 per cent in El 
Salvador, and only in Brazil has fallen 
back to 2.2 per cent In absolute terms 
the numbers go on rising well after the 
rate of increase has begun to decline. In 
Venezuela the absolute increment in the 
labour force toward the end of the 
century would be about double the 
yearly increase registered in the late 
1960s; and even in Brazil the number to 
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be absorbed each year would be nearly 
two-thirds larger. It is only well into the 
next century that the growth of the 
labour force (as here defined) begins to 
slow down to the rates now commonly 
prevailing in the advanced industrial 
countries, and that the absolute numbers 
to be absorbed show signs of dwindling. 
Even in the case of extreme hypothe-
ses, then, the underlying population 
characteristics ensure that the labour 
force will continue to expand rapidly in 
most of the region through the rest of 
this century. In many countries its 
growth will actually speed up in the 
years immediately ahead. Employment 
policies must therefore be framed to deal 
with employment pressures about as great 
as those which have been experienced in 
recent years, and with the likelihood of 
the situation's being especially serious in 
the 1970s and early 1980s in this respect. 
The farther the decline in fertility rates 
falls short of this extreme hypothesis, the 
farther into the future will the period of 
maximum pressure extend. 
There is one qualification of this 
picture which needs to be touched on 
here, even though it can only be adequate-
ly discussed later, with the aid of the 
simulation exercises. It is the urban 
employment situation which is usually 
of greatest concern to policy-makers, 
and rural-urban migration can cause the 
rate of increase in the urban labour force 
to vary greatly, independently of the 
trend for the labour force as a whole. 
Table 5 shows rates of growth of the 
urban population in recent decades, 
from which it can be presumed that the 
urban labour force in each country has 
increased much faster than is indicated 
by the figures shown in table 4. In Vene-
zuela and Brazil in particular the urban 
labour force has grown very rapidly 
during the post-World War II period. 
Both recent and future trends 
depend heavily on how far urbanization 
has gone and how fast it is progressing. 
In a country such as Venezuela, where 
urbanization has been swift and has gone 
a relatively long way (only about one-
fifth of the population is still rural), this 
has meant both a period of extremely 
rapid expansion in the urban labour 
force and a probability that future 
increases will be more moderate; already 
in the 1960s the growth rate of the 
urban population, although still nearly 5 
per cent per annum, was much lower 
than in the preceding two decades. In a 
country like El Salvador, by contrast, 
the bulk of the population is still rural, 
and the possibility of a speeding-up of 
migration and consequently of the 
growth of the urban labour force 
remains in the future. 
As noted above, this subject is dis-
cussed more fully in the context of the 
simulation exercises. 
(d) Urban-rural and regional differences 
The discussion up to this point has 
concentrated on population characte-
ristics at the national level, with some 
references to trends in Latin America as 
a whole. There are often, however, signi-
ficant urban-rural, and on occasion 
regional, differences within individual 
countries, and these are not only of 
interest in themselves, but are also 
important factors in determining trends 
at the national level. One of the essential 
reasons for undertaking the simulation 
exercises described in the next section 
was precisely to try to take these diffe-
rences into account and to appraise their 
impact on the national aggregates. They 
are therefore discussed in more detail 
later; but it is useful here to point out 
several of the main features. 
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Table 5 



























































































aUrban population as defined in census data. This includes smaller cities not shown in either 
of the following two columns. 
t>The growth rates in these columns relate to'a fixed list of cities, the composition of the list 
being determined by the population in 1960. They arc therefore not affected by cities shifting 
from one category to another as the population increases. The data are from CELADE, Boletín 
Demográfico, Year IV, N9 9. 
First, there is the widely-noted fact 
that the urban population is generally 
increasing much faster than the rural 
population. Trends in the countries 
being considered are shown in table 5. In 
both Argentina and Venezuela migration 
to the cities has for some time more than 
offset the natural increase in the rural 
population: in Argentina the absolute 
size of the rural population has declined 
substantially since the mid-1940s and in 
Venezuela there has been a small net 
decrease since 1941. In Brazil the rural 
population has continued to increase, at 
least through 1970, but since 1940 the 
rate of increase has been falling steadily 
and is dropping ever farther below the 
national average. Only in El Salvador is 
the situation somewhat different. In that 
country the rural population has grown 
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faster in recent decades, in line with the 
rising rate of total population increase, 
and until around 1950 even grew some-
what more quickly than the urban 
population. 
With this single exception, the urban 
population in each country, and in all 
recent intercensal periods, has increased 
more rapidly than the rural population. 
In El Salvador the difference is modest, 
but in the other three countries it is 
striking. At the extreme, in Venezuela 
the urban population increased through-
out the 1940s and 1950s at an average 
rate of about 6% per cent per annum. 
Table 5 also shows the rates of popu-
lation increase in the larger cities in the 
different countries, another aspect which 
has received considerable attentioa As 
can be seen, the expansion of these 
larger cities is often, but not always, 
even more rapid than that of the urban 
population as a whole. 
As was discussed earlier, at the natio-
nal level there is considerable variation in 
the age structures of the different 
countries; and within a particular 
country somewhat similar variations can 
be observed between the urban and rural 
populations and on occasion on a 
regional basis. Table 6 shows the urban 
and rural age structures in each of the 
four countries. 
The differences in age structure are 
quite consistent, and often substantial. 
The percentage of children (up to 15 
years of age) is in each country a much 
larger proportion of the rural than of the 
urban population, the difference ranging 
from 11 percentage points in Argentina 
down to 5 in Venezuela. This gap may 
well widen for some time in certain 
countries, primarily because the decline 
in fertility rates, and the consequent 
reduction in the relative importance of 
the youngest age groups, tends to take 
place first in the urban areas. The 15-19 
age group is where the transition occurs. 
In Argentina this group, represents, as do 
children under 15, a smaller proportion 
of the urban than of the rural popula-
tion; in the other countries it is relatively 
larger in the urban areas but the diffe-
rences are rather slight. 
Table 6 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION, BY AGE GROUP,8 
OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS 
Age group 
0 - 4 \ 
5 - 1 4 J 
1 5 - 19 
2 0 - 3 9 
4 0 - 6 4 



























































aThe calculations are based on the latest available census'data, which are from the 1970 
census for Brazil and from those taken around 1960 for the other countries. 
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The adult population as a whole 
-those of 20 or more years of age- is 
the counterpart of the child population 
and accounts for a bigger share of the 
urban population in each country, 
although there is a good deal of variation 
within the total. This greater relative 
importance in the cities is striking in 
Argentina in the case of the older half of 
the adult population; in Brazil and El 
Salvador it is uniform, if more modest, 
throughout the adult age groups; and in 
Venezuela it is confined to the young 
adults, while the older half of the adult 
population is actually a slightly smaller 
proportion of the total in the urban 
areas. These variations reflect the 
shifting importance of the two principal 
factors underlying these differences in 
age structure: fertility rates and the scale 
of migration. In Venezuela, for example, 
migration was very substantial during the 
1940s and 1950s, and since it is prima-
rily the young who migrate this resulted 
in an unusually large concentration of 
young adults in the urban areas. 
There are also significant differences 
from one country to another. Although 
there are consistent dissimilarities bet-
ween the rural and urban age structures 
within each country, the urban (or rural) 
age structures are not all alike; in parti-
cular, the rural age structure in Argentina 
is more similar to the urban than to the 
rural structures in the other countries. 
Moreover, this cross-classification shows 
the range to be very great. The relative 
importance of children, for example, 
varies from less than 28 per cent of the 
urban population in Argentina to nearly 
half the rural population in Venezuela. 
Other differences are revealed by the data 
presented in table 6. 
Table 7 shows the same data organ-
ized somewhat differently, to indicate 
the percentage of each age group which 
lives in the urban and rural areas of the 
country concerned. The youngest age 
group is always of greatest relative 
importance in the rural areas (and least 
in the cities). In Venezuela the rural 
percentage falls steadily through the 
young adult group and then rises again 
for the older adult population. In the 
other three countries the rural percen-
tage follows an unbroken downward 
trend throughout the age structure. 
These different age structures tend 
to aggravate one of the region's major 
economic problems: the much lower 
productivity and income levels in the 
rural areas. Since the dependent popula-
tion is everywhere a substantially higher 
proportion of the total in the rural areas 
this pulls per capita incomes even farther 
below urban levels than they would be 
anyway because of the lower producti-
vity per worker. In addition, the fact 
that children constitute the great bulk of 
this dependent population complicates 
the educational problem. Children, rela-
tive to the rest of the population, are 
concentrated in the rural areas, where 
adequate educational facilities are in any 
case more difficult to provide and where 
low incomes limit the local contribution. 
This population structure is likely to 
be an important aspect of the difficulties 
of the rural areas: except for Argentina, 
only about half of the rural population is 
in the active age groups, even if these are 
stretched to include all persons from 15 
to 65 years of age. 
It is also worth noting that women 
appear to migrate to the cities in signifi-
cantly greater numbers than men, which 
perhaps reflects the type of employment 
most easily found in the urban areas; 
domestic and other low-income service 
positions commonly filled by women are 
probably more readily available. For the 
different countries table 8 shows the 
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Table 7 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EACH AGE GROUPa 
BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 
Age group 
0 - 4 
5 - 1 4 
1 5 - 19 
20 - 39 
4 0 - 6 4 






































































Calculations are based on the same data used for table 6. 
proportion of women and of men, in 
each age group, living in the urban areas. 
The percentages are essentially the same 
for the 0-4 age group, reflecting fertility 
patterns, but thereafter a consistently 
higher proportion of the female popula-
tion is found in the cities. 
Similar variations in the age structure 
may also occur between different regions 
within a country, a situation which can 
be illustrated with data from Brazil. 
Table 9 shows the age structure in the 
state of Sao Paulo, a high-income area, 
and in the North-east region, a low-
income area; in both areas urban and 
rural age structures are shown separately 
so that the urban-rural and regional 
influences are not mixed. Table 10 again 
Table 8 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PROPORTIONS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS, 
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP 
Age group 
0*- 4 
5 - 14 
15 - 19 
2 0 - 39 
4 0 - 6 4 
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Table 9 
BRAZIL: AGE COMPOSITION OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS 
IN SXO PAULO AND IN THE NORTH-EAST, 1970a 
Age group 































0 - 4 




65 and over 
Percentage figures calculated from unadjusted census data. 
Table 10 
BRAZIL: PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL POPULATION IN SELECTED 
AREAS, BY AGE GROUP3 
Age group 
0 - 4 
5- 14 
1 5 - 19 
2 0 - 39 
40-64 
































aThe percentages across do not total 100 as major areas of Brazil are not included in the table. 
Calculations are based on the data in table 9. 
presents the same information in a diffe-
rent form, giving for each age group the 
proportion of the nationwide total living 
in the different zones. 
The figures in table 9 show the now 
familiar and consistent sort of variation. 
At one extreme is the age structure in the 
urban areas of Sao Paulo with a relatively 
small proportion of children and with a 
large proportion of the population in the 
active age groups; and that this is a shift 
of the sort referred to is shown by 
comparison with the figures for the 
urban areas of Brazil as a whole (see 
table 6). The rural areas of Sao Paulo 
have an age structure very similar to that 
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of the cities of the North-east, i.e., an 
intermediate situation. And at the other 
extreme is the age structure of the rural 
North-east, with a large dependent popu-
lation and a much smaller proportion in 
the active age groups. 
Table 10 shows the cities of Sao 
Paulo to have only 12 per cent of the 
infant population of the country (under 
The simulation exercises are designed to 
provide detailed projections, to the year 
2000, of population and labour force 
trends in the selected countries. They are 
of course not predictions, but rather cal-
culations of what will occur given 
specific assumptions about the principal 
variables which determine the model, 
ie., fertility and death rates to calculate 
population trends, and then labour force 
participation rates to derive the labour 
force. Each of these variables is specified 
by sex and by 5-year age groups. In 
addition, one of the central aims of the 
simulation exercises is to calculate the 
effect of urban-rural and regional diffe-
rences, so each variable is given a set of 
values for each of the regions considered, 
and within each region for the urban and 
the rural areas. This necessitates taking 
internal migration info consideration, 
and so migration rates are another key 
variable; again these are specified by sex 
and by 5-year age groups. For Venezuela 
and El Salvador the exercises distinguish 
only between the urban and the rural 
areas, but for Argentina and Brazil regio-
nal divisions are also taken into account. 
The first step was to estimate all 
these values for the base year, 1970.4 
The CELADE estimates of population 
5 years of age) to care for, but close to 
18 per cent of the most active age groups 
(20-64) to provide income. The rural 
areas of the North-east have 21 per cent 
of the infant population but only 16 per 
cent of the major income-earning groups. 
The implications of such differences 
are similar to those mentioned in earlier 
sections. 
by 5-year age groups and of age-specific 
fertility and death rates provided figures 
at the national level for each country 
Then, with the use of census data, esti-
mates were made of urban-rural and, 
where applicable, regional differences for 
each of the variables in the model. 
Values, by sex and 5-year age group, 
were calculated for each region and/or 
the urban and rural areas so that they 
were consistent with the CELADE aggre-
gate estimates for the country. Labour 
force participation rates and the age 
structure of internal migration were 
estimated on the basis of census data 
alone. 
Starting with these base year estima-
tes, the simulation exercises calculate 
trends to the year 2000 in the light of a 
given set of assumptions as to how the 
values of the underlying variables will 
change during that period. Five different 
simulation exercises were carried out for 
each country. The specific assumptions 
4
 For Venezuela and El Salvador detailed 
data from the 1970 censuses were not yet avai-
lable, so estimates were originally prepared for 
1960 and calculations were then made to repro-
duce the 1970 situation in so far as this was 
known. 
2. 
The simulation exercises 
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were made in the context of each of the 
individual countries, but the exercises 
were designed to have a common pattern 
for every country, and their general 
nature can be indicated here. 
The first exercise assumes relatively 
little change from the 1970 situation. 
Fertility rates decline only moderately, 
there is relatively little internal migra-
tion, and labour force participation rates 
remain nearly unaltered. Changes are 
generally of similar magnitude in diffe-
rent areas of the country; that is, there 
are no important relative shifts between 
different regions and/or the urban-rural 
areas. 
The second exercise postulates that 
within a context of economic and social 
transformation which is largely concen-
trated in the more modern areas, the 
variables undergo changes, mainly in the 
more advanced regions and/or in the 
urban areas. Substantial internal migra-
tion is assumed, toward the more 
developed regions and/or toward the 
cities; urban fertility rates decline sharply 
-a t least in the more developed 
regions- to around the zero growth rate 
in a stable population; urban labour 
force participation rates shift to about 
the present European values (the 1968 
French rates). The changes in the less 
developed regions and/or the rural areas 
are not as pronounced, but are still more 
substantial than those postulated in the 
first exercise. 
The third experiment again assumes 
that changes are concentrated in the 
more modern areas, where, however, 
while still considerable, they are not as 
marked as in the second exercise. In the 
less developed regions and/or the rural 
areas the changes are similar to the 
postulates of the second exercise. 
The fourth exercise assumes econo-
mic and social change of a different 
type, concentrated largely in the less 
modern areas. There is less migration 
here than in any of the other exercises, 
and a larger proportion of the popula-
tion remains in the less developed 
regions and/or the rural areas. And it is 
primarily the variables in these areas that 
change: fertility rates decline substan-
tially, and move much closer to those in 
the more developed regions and/or the 
urban areas; labour force participation 
rates shift approximately to the present 
structure in the more developed regions 
and/or the cities. In the context of this 
exercise, more moderate changes are pro-
jected for the better-developed regions 
and/or the urban areas. 
Finally, the fifth exercise postulates 
more balanced change, spread through 
both the more and the less modern areas. 
The population structure toward the end 
of the century, as between the different 
regions and the urban-rural areas, is 
intermediate between those projected in 
the third and in the fourth exercises; and 
the values assigned to the different 
coefficients are also intermediate bet-
ween those used in these two exercises. 
The values assigned to mortality 
rates have been omitted from this des-
cription of the simulation exercises. This 
simplifies the discussion, and has been 
done because mortality rates have less 
differential impact on the calculations 
than the other variables. In the CELADE 
population projections four alternative 
possibilities are normally presented. 
Each of the four postulates a different 
rate of decline in fertility rates, but as 
there is less uncertainty about mortality 
trends the same mortality rates are used 
in each of the four projections. A similar 
procedure has been followed in the simu-
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lation exercises. Mortality rates often 
differ in different areas of the country, 
and these variations have been estimated 
for the base year, 1970. The CELADE 
projections to the end of the century are 
then used as a guideline. In the first 
three simulations exercises it is assumed 
that mortality rates in the different areas 
all decrease in line with the CELADE 
projections; that is, the structure of rela-
tive mortality rates in different areas 
does not change. In the fourth exercise 
the assumption is that, as part of the 
concentration on the less modern areas, 
mortality rates in such areas are gra-
dually reduced to the level of those 
prevailing in the cities; by the end of the 
century mortality rates are uniform 
throughout the country. Here too the 
fifth exercise represents an intermediate 
position between the fourth exercise and 
the others. 
The results of the set of simulation 
exercises were first analysed separately, 
and in some detail, for each of the four 
countries. These individual country 
studies have been presented as internal 
CEPAL working documents. The follow-
ing discussion is confined to an analysis 
of the more general conclusions which 
can be drawn from comparisons of the 
different country projections, but of 
course it depends heavily on the earlier 
country analyses. 
While in several important respects 
inferences can be drawn for Latin Ameri-
ca as a whole, one of the most important 
general conclusions must be that in 
population parameters and trends there 
is an impressive range of intra-regio nal 
variation. Any statement about "condi-
tions in Latin America" is apt to refer to 
some kind of average, around which 
there is considerable dispersion, instead 
of describing a situation which is the 
common norm throughout the region. 
(a) The situation around 1970 
To begin with, the two major popu-
lation parameters —fertility rates and 
death rates —have evolved in quite diffe-
rent ways in the countries analysed, so 
that the 1970 rates of population growth 
and age structures, as well as the parame-
ters themselves, vary considerably. At 
the national level, fertility rates in 
Argentina have been declining for some 
time and are now moderately low; in the 
other three countries they remain very 
high, although in Brazil and Venezuela 
there has been a modest decrease in 
recent years. Death rates have been 
greatly reduced in all countries, but with 
the partial exception of Argentina, there 
is still considerable scope for further 
reductions. It is well to observe at once 
that the setting-apart of Argentina 
already noted will tend to continue 
throughout this analysis; the general 
population structure has evolved much 
further in Argentina than in any of the 
other countries studied and when diffe-
rent aspects are considered it will often 
be found that the values or trends cha-
racterizing that country are markedly 
different from those prevailing else-
where. 
But these values at the national level 
are already averages of widely differing 
figures in major areas within the indivi-
dual countries, and in this respect Argen-
tina is no exception. Table 11 shows the 
total fertility rate in 1970 in each of the 
areas distinguished in the analysis; rela-
tive infant mortality rates are also shown 
to give some idea of the variation in 
death rates.5 
5
 Up to about the age of 50 the variation in 
age-specific death rates among the different 
areas is fairly similar to that shown for infiinl 
mortality rates. From about the age of 50 on 
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Table 11 
SELECTED AREAS: ESTIMATES OF TOTAL FERTILITY RATES AND RELATIVE 
INFANT MORTALITY RATES, 1965-1970 



































Brazil, less-developed rural 
El Salvador, rural 
Brazil, intermediate rural 
Argentina, North rural 
Brazil, developed rural 
El Salvador, urban 
Venezuela, urban 
Brazil, less-developed urban 
Argentina, South, rural 
Argentina, North urban 
Brazil, intermediate urban 
Brazil, developed urban 
Argentina, South urban 
With the exception of the rural 
South in Argentina, fertility rates are 
higher in all rural areas than in any urban 
zone, but there are major variations 
within each grouping. At the top of the 
list are three rural areas where the total 
fertility rate remains at the very high 
level of more than 7 (the figure can be 
approximately interpreted as the number 
of children the average woman would 
have during her lifetime, given the pre-
vailing age-specific fertility rates). The 
decline is then moderately rapid to a 
cluster of one rural and three urban areas 
with total fertility rates ranging around 
5%. Then comes a sharp drop to another 
the range narrows greatly; at more advanced 
ages death rates tend to be more similar 
throughout the areas analysed. 
rural area plus three urban areas with 
rates of Vh. to 4; and finally, well below 
all of the others, the relatively low total 
fertility rate in the urban South of 
Argentina. 
Except in this last area, fertility rates 
are everywhere at least moderately high, 
but the range is very wide. The cluster of 
areas with figures of from 2>Vi to 4, for 
example, have total fertility rates only 
about half those prevailing in the three 
areas at the top of the list; and there are 
major population groups in both clus-
ters. It is always useful to bear in mind 
that when the total fertility rate in Latin 
America in 1970 is placed at about 5.4, 
this is an average figure covering areas 
with rates as widely varying as those 
shown. 
POPULATION AND THE LABOUR FORCE IN LATIN AMERICA / Charles Rollins 151 
To some extent death rates follow an 
order of ranking similar to that of fertili-
ty rates - i n particular, the areas with 
low infant mortality rates tend to be the 
same as those with relatively low fertility 
rates- but there are striking exceptions. 
In general infant mortality rates appear 
to vary at least as much by region as on 
an urban-rural basis; thus the areas with 
the highest infant mortality rates include 
the urban as well as the rural areas in El 
Salvador, and likewise the less-developed 
region in Brazil. Here too there is a very 
great range: infant mortality rates in the 
less-developed rural area of Brazil and in 
El Salvador appear to be well over 
double those recorded in the areas with 
the lowest figures. Too much cannot be 
made of these comparisons, however, as 
in general the data on which the estimates 
are based are less complete than those 
available for making the fertility rate 
estimates. 
These differing population parame-
ters, with the additional major factor of 
internal migration flows, have led to 
differing age structures in different areas, 
and to dissimilar geographic, and in 
particular rural-urban, population struc-
tures. These aspects have already been 
analysed in comparative terms, and in 
the context of the recent past. With 
respect to age structures all that need be 
recalled here is that, except in Argentina, 
populations are everywhere still very 
young, especially in the rural areas. As 
regards rural-urban structures, it is useful 
to summarize the degree of urbanization 
in 1970 in the regions analysed (see table 
12). 
Again the range is wide, and several 
of the major regions have reached very 
high degrees of urbanization. From these 
figures follow important implications 
about migration flows. In each of the 
first four regions the rural-urban flow in 
recent years has been on a large enough 
scale to result in a notable contraction in 
the absolute size of the rural population. 
In the next two regions of Brazil rural-
Table 12 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IN 1970a 
Region Percentage of population in urban areas 
Argentina, South region 
Brazil, developed region 
Venezuela 
Argentina, North region 
Brazil, intermediate region 









aThe definitions of 'urban area' adopted here are those of the respective censuses, which 
generally refer to cities with a population of 1 000 or more; in the case of Brazil, however, the 
definition appears to be based more on the type of administrative unit. The percentage shown for 
the developed region of Brazil is in fact the figure for the State of Sao Paulo, which is more 
appropriate in view of the way the developed region is defined in the study. 
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urban migration has also been substan-
tial, even though the rural populations 
have continued to increase moderately 
rapidly. El Salvador is the only country, 
or region, analysed where rural-urban 
migration in recent years has been rela-
tively insignificant, at least in relation to 
natural rates of population growth in the 
rural area. 
Given the scale of internal migration, 
the structure of the migration flows 
becomes another variable of considerable 
importance,, and here there is much less 
diversity among the countries analysed. 
The common characteristics are that it is 
primarily the very young who migrate, 
and that women migrate more than men. 
That migrants tend to be young is a 
commonplace, but they are perhaps 
surprisingly so in Latin America, particu-
larly the women. It is in the rural-urban 
migration flows that women predomi-
nate, but even over the greater distances 
involved in regional migration in Argen-
tina and Brazil they appear to migrate in 
numbers approximately equal to the 
figures for men. The structure of migra-
tion tends to be fairly similar in the 
different countries. 
This then is the general demographic 
background which forms the starting-
point for the simulation exercises: very 
considerable diversity, within as well as 
among the countries analysed, with 
Argentina a case apart in many respects; 
fertility rates, and hence population 
growth rates, for the most part ranging 
from moderately high to very high, major 
migration flows nearly everywhere, but 
with widely varying degrees of urbanization 
already achieved in the different regions. 
(b) Projected population trends 
(i) Trends at the national level. The 
first question is: how fast is the popula-
tion likely to increase from 1970 to the 
end of the century, and how much do 
the projections change with changing 
assumptions about the underlying popu-
lation parameters? Populations increase 
most rapidly with the assumptions of 
little change from the 1970 situation 
adopted in the first exercise, and least 
rapidly with the great change postulated 
in the second exercise, so a comparison 
of these two experiments will show the 
probable limits involved (see table 13). 
The extent to which Argentina is a 
case apart is at once clear. The popula-
tion will increase only moderately to the 
end of the century and the range of 
uncertainty is quite small; the difference 
between the maximum and minimum 
end-of-the-century projections is only 12 
per cent of the 1970 population. 
In each of the other three countries 
the population more than doubles over 
the 30-year-period even in the minimum 
projection, and to the extent the 
substantial changes assumed in the 
second exercise do not occur the 
increase will be even larger. This means 
than the average rate of population 
increase will be at least 2.4 per cent per 
annum from 1970 to the end of the 
century, and probably significantly 
higher in most countries. 
It is important to stress that this 
large increase occurs despite assumptions 
which lead to big reductions in fertility 
rates. First, large-scale migration to the 
cities, and in Brazil to the more 
developed regions, is assumed; and as the 
rates in question are substantially lower 
in these areas the effect is a considerable 
decline in the total national fertility rate. 
Secondly, it is directly assumed that fer-
tility rates in the urban areas drop 
sharply, at least in the more developed 
regions, to the level of zero population 
growth in an eventually stable popula-
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Table 13 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PROJECTED POPULATION INCREASES TO THE END OF 
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Hon. The net result is that in 30 years 
the total fertility rate decreases from 
about 5.4 to about 3.1 in Brazil, from 
6.6 to 3.1 in El Salvador, and from 6.0 
to only 2.5 in Venezuela. 
That populations nevertheless in-
crease rapidly over the period is a reflec-
tion of the very youthful age structure 
in most of Latin America. The very 
high fertility rates which have prevailed 
in many areas would have produced even 
higher rates of population increase with 
a stable age structure, but, owing mainly 
to the way in which the shift to higher 
rates of increase occurred, the age struc-
ture in most countries is still in a process 
of fairly rapid evolution. It was primarily 
the number of children which first 
increased very rapidly, thanks to falling 
infant mortality rates in the 1940s and 
1950s, and this bulge is only now begin-
ning to work its way through the adult 
age structure. In consequence, the num-
bers in the most fertile age groups will be 
rising rapidly in the coming decades in 
most countries —usually a good deal 
faster than the population as a whole-
and this will be a major factor in increa-
sing the number of births, and offsetting 
increases in age-specific fertility rates. 
Thus even if fertility rates should fall 
rapidly, as in the second exercise, a 
prolonged period is likely to pass before 
the full impact is felt. The rates of pupula-
tion increase at the end of the century in 
the second exercise are important to 
note in this respect. They have by that 
time declined to 2 per cent per annum or 
less, and as the numbers in the fertile age 
groups are no longer increasing so rapid-
ly (reflecting the decline in fertility rates 
which began several decades earlier), the 
downward trend might well continue a 
good deal farther in the early decades of 
the next century. This is an indication of 
the very long-term nature of population 
changes; even sharp changes in the para-
meters may well require several decades 
to produce the expected results. 
If there is no big drop in fertility 
rates the youthful age structure may 
actually result in rising rates of popula-
tion growth in some countries in the 
years ahead. Thus even though the first 
experiment does assume some decrease 
in fertility rates, the figures above show 
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that rates of population increase at the 
end of the century are not necessarily 
lower than the average for the period as 
a whole. In Brazil there is a very small 
rise during the 1975-1985 period, but 
the rate of increase is essentially 
constant to the end of the century; in 
Venezuela there is a more significant 
upswing during the 1975-1985 period, 
after which the rate declines slowly to 
the end of the century; and in El Sal-
vador the rate continues to climb, from 
3.2 per cent per annum in 1970 to 3.6 
per cent at the end of the century. 
Argentina apart, then, it is clear that 
the population will increase very 
substantially in Latin America, and even 
if fertility rates should begin an imme-
diate and rapid downward movement 
—which has not yet ocurred in most of 
the region- the rate of increase will 
remain high at least to the end of the 
century. Two very general economic 
issues of interest here are the implica-
tions of such an increase for per capita 
resource availabilities and for the poten-
tial size of the market. Each of these 
would of course require a thorough 
study of its own before much could be 
said about it, but the figures shown in 
table 14 are of interest as a general, 
although imprecise, sort of indicator. 
In terms of the resource base - i n so 
far as this is indicated by the simplistic 
measure of population density- Latin 
America will continue to be among the 
more favoured regions of the world. For 
the region as a whole the population 
density at the end of the century will 
probably be around 30, i.e., somewhat 
higher than the figures shown for Brazil 
and Venezuela; in the South American 
continent the overall density will be 
lower, and this will be offset by higher 
densities in Central America and the 
Caribbean. The corresponding figure for 
the world as a whole is already about 30 
in the mid-1970s, although densities in 
the areas regarded as resource-rich are of 
course much lower.6 
Thus, even with the rapid population 
increase which will occur, the region as a 
whole will not be particularly densely 
populated at the end of the century. But 
the resource base will have become much 
less generous than it has been customary 
to assume. From the early post-World 
War II period to the end of the century 
the population of the region will have 
approximately quadrupled, and this of 
course means that the per capita resource 
base will have been cut by three-
quarters in half a century. In the 
mid-1970s the world as a whole is no 
longer considered to be especially 
resource-rich in relation to its popula-
tion, and it is roughly the present world 
density level that at the end of the 
century will characterize Latin America. 
With respect to markets, in the 
region as a whole the number of poten-
tial consumers will clearly more than 
suffice, to support even those modern 
industries with very large economies of 
scales. The important question here is 
the extent to which the population can 
be integrated into the production 
process so as to provide real money 
demand for the products of such indus-
tries. But also, at least with present 
institutional arrangements, markets need 
to be considered on a national rather 
than on a regional basis, and this is 
6
 For example, population densities in the 
mid-1970s were around 11 in the USSR, 22 in 
the United States, 2 in Canada and Oceania, 13 
in Africa, and 16 in Latin America itself. To 
take examples of densely-populated areas, the 
figure was around 155 in Western Europe, over 
180 in India, more than 290 in Japan, and 
around 475 in Bangladesh. 
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another situation in which the diversity 
is striking. 
In Argentina, since the total popula-
tion is moderately large, and is already 
more generally integrated and has higher 
incomes than in most countries, the mar-
ket should be big enough to support a 
reasonably diversified modern economy. 
At the same time the population density 
will remain low, implying an unusually 
favourable per capita resource base; in 
particular there are rich agricultural 
resources, a key asset in a world expec-
ted to be beset by food supply problems. 
Argentina may well find itself in a 
uniquely favourable situation in the 
region in these broadest economic terms. 
Brazil stands out in a different way. 
The resource base, as expressed in terms 
of population density, will be somewhat 
better than the average for the region as 
a whole (although worse than the South 
American average); but the potential 
market will be very large. The Brazilian 
population at the end of the century will 
be of the same order of magnitude as 
those of the economic superpowers of 
the post-World War II period: the EEC, 
the United States, or the USSR. The 
major issue in Brazil in this connexion 
will be the extent to which that popula-
tion can be integrated into the modern 
economy so as to provide an effective 
market with real purchasing power. 
Although their population will not be 
nearly so large as Brazil's, this sort of 
situation is likely to characterize other 
major countries in the region. Mexico 
will have a very big population, and the 
limiting factor in market terms will be 
the extent to which that population can 
be integrated; densities wul be well over 
double those in Brazil. And both Colom-
bia and Peru will have populations of a 
size to support diversified economies, if, 
again, they can be integrated into the 
economy so as to provide effective 
monetary markets. 
Venezuela's situation is more similar to 
Argentina's but rather less favourable in 
both respects. Population density will be 
more than double that of Argentina at the 
end of the century, yet the total market 
will be significantly smaller. Income levels 
are likely to be high, however, so that the 
population can be expected to be relatively 
fully integrated and the effective market 
large in relation to the population. 
Finally, El Salvador is in a much less 
favourable position. Population density 
Table 14 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PROJECTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000 
Country Total population (millions) 
Number of inhabitants 





31 to 34 
Í94 to 225 
7.6 to 9.7 
22 to 26 
l i t o 12 
23 to 26 
354 to 455 
24 to 29 
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will be very high —to the point that mere 
pressure on resources, especially land, 
may be a major problem- and at the 
same time the total population is not 
large enough to provide the basic market 
for a diversified, internally-oriented eco-
nomy. Although to less extreme degrees, 
a number of the smaller countries of the 
region may easily find themselves in this 
sort of situation in the decades ahead. 
(ii) Trends in the different areas. In 
addition to the total population increase, 
it is of major importance to determine 
where that increase is likely to occur and 
the implications this will have for the 
different areas. In much of Latin Ameri-
ca a substantial proportion of the 
population is still rural, and since fertili-
ty rates are generally much higher in the 
rural areas, it is often there that most of 
the population increase originates. But 
migration to the cities is occurring every-
where, often on a large scale, so that in 
general it is the urban areas which will 
absorb the bulk of the population 
increase in the decades ahead. To a lesser 
extent the same sort of considerations 
will apply as between more and less 
developed regions within the larger 
countries. 
Trends and the possible range of 
variation can be seen by comparing the 
results of the third and fourth simulation 
exercises. The third assumes continuing 
modern-type development, oriented 
towards the cities and, in Argentina and 
Brazil, the more developed regions; 
large-scale migration; and major decrea-
ses in urban fertility rates, although not 
so great as with the extreme assumptions 
of the second exercise. The fourth simu-
lation, in contrast, assumes a shift to a 
less modern-type development, oriented 
towards the rural areas and the less-
developed regions; there is very little 
migration, and it is primarily the popula-
tion parameters in the rural areas which 
are assumed to change. These two expe-
riments thus show the extreme extents 
to which the population increase might 
remain in the rural areas (and the less-
developed regions) or might shift to the 
cities instead. Comparative figures are 
shown in table 15. 
Given the assumptions of the fourth 
exercise, except in Argentina there is not 
much change in the distribution of the 
population, and rates of increase are 
fairly similar from one area to another 
within each country.7 But even in the 
fourth exercise El Salvador is the only 
country where somewhat more than half 
the population increase takes place in 
the rural areas; in the other countries, 
even if migration is held to a minimum, 
it is primarily the cities which will have 
to accommodate the increment. In 
regional terms, however, the position 
alters: practically half the total increase 
would occur in the less-developed region 
in Brazil, and well over half in the North 
of Argentina. 
With the assumptions of the third 
exercise, on the other hand, the situation 
is very different. There are substantial 
shifts in the distribution of the popula-
tion in all countries toward the cities 
and, in Brazil, toward the more developed 
regions. Practically all the popula-
tion increase is accounted for by the 
expansion of the urban areas, and most 
of it occurs in the more developed 
regions of Brazil and Argentina. And, of 
course, rates of population growth are 
7
 The low fertility rates in the urban South 
of Argentina mean that population growth in 
this area depends to an unusual extent on 
migration. Thus with the limited migration 
assumed in the fourth exercise the population 
of the area does not increase much and its share 
in the total declines from 62.5 per cent in 1970 
to 54.8 per cent at the end of the century. 
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Table 15 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT AREAS 
IN THE PROJECTED POPULATION INCREASE, 1970-2000 












































































































































very much higher in the cities than in the 
rural areas; except in Argentina, the 
urban growth rates are everywhere high, 
ranging from 3.3 per cent to 5 per cent 
per annum for the 30-year period as a 
whole. Because of the gradually dimi-
nishing impact of migration as the shift to 
the cities proceeds, as well as the marked 
fall in urban fertility rates, these rates of 
increase are even higher at the beginning 
of the period and then decline to lower 
levels at the end of the century. 
These potential shifts in population 
structures and the variations in possible 
rates of increase in the different areas are 
of major importance, and were analysed 
in some detail in the individual country 
studies. Several different 'type' situa-
tions are apparent —depending upon the 
1970 population distribution and upon 
variations in fertility rates— and these 
are worth summarizing for their general 
implications. 
Venezuela is the best illustration of 
likely trends in a country which was 
already quite highly urbanized in 1970. 
There the bulk of the population 
increase occurs in the cites under all 
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assumptions; even with the limited mi-
gration assumed in the fourth exercise, 
over three-quarters of the increase is 
found in the cities, and if substantial 
migration continues, essentially the entire 
increase will be urban (during the 1960s 
the rural population actually declined). 
This state of affairs has several 
important implications. Its direct conse-
quence is simply that facilities required 
for the growing population will have to 
be provided largely, or even entirely, in 
the urban areas; because of greater densi-
ties and the habitual provision of more 
services in the cities, this will mean that 
infrastructure costs are likely to be rela-
tively high. 
A second implication is that, since 
the rural population has already been 
reduced to a minor proportion of the 
total, the impact of continuing migration 
on the cities will be relatively slight, and 
the increase in the urban population will 
depend primarily on fertility rates in the 
cities themselves. Thus in Venezuela, on 
the assumption of continuing rapid 
migration adopted in the third simula-
tion, newly-arriving migrants account for 
only about 18 per cent of the total 
increase in the urban population at the 
beginning of the period and the figure 
decreases to about 14 per cent at the end 
of the century (despite the fact that 
urban fertility rates fall sharply over the 
30-year period). Related to the total, the 
number of migrants arriving in a year 
would be only about 2/3 of one per cent 
of the urban population in the early 
1970s and the proportion would decline 
to less than 1/3 of one per cent at the 
end of the century. Migration in these 
conditions will continue to be a major 
factor in determining the size and com-
position of the rural population, but its 
significance for the cities will become 
increasingly marginal. 
A logical corollary is that the nature 
of the urban population will gradually 
change: migrants will become a steadily 
smaller proportion of the total. Even 
with the third simulation's assumptions 
of continuing large-scale migration, less 
than 10 per cent of the urban population 
in Venezuela at the end of the century 
will be migrants who have lived in the 
cities for less than 30 years; over 80 per 
cent of that population will have been 
born in the cities. Recent arrivals from 
the rural areas were a much bigger 
proportion of the urban population 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
shift can be expected to have a powerful 
impact on expectations, and in general 
on social, economic and political orien-
tations in the urban areas. 
Finally, and perhaps of greatest 
importance, the fact that the massive 
shift to the cities has already occurred, 
and that the impact of migration is dimi-
nishing, will mean that rates of urban 
population growth can also be expected 
to decline. In Venezuela the urban popu-
lation increased at rates of well over 6 
per cent per annum during the 1940s 
and 1950s, with newly-arriving migrants 
representing more than half the incre-
ment Around 1960 the incidence of 
migration began to lessen markedly 
(two-thirds of the population was 
already urban by that date), and the 
annual rate of urban population growth 
began to slacken correspondingly. In the 
second half of the 1960s this rate was 
already much slower -4 .7 per cent- and 
it will continue to decline steadily.8 The 
8
 How fast it declines will also, of course, 
depend on the trend in urban fertility rates. It 
will fall to around 3 per cent at the end of the 
century, if these do not decrease much, and to 
around 1xh per cent if they do, even assuming 
that substantial migration continues. 
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period of most rapid urban population 
growth is therefore already over, and in 
Venezuela future rates of increase will be 
much lower than the peak rates of the 
recent past. As a result, pressures for 
urban employment, housing, social servi-
ces, etc., should be a good deal less 
intensive, at least in relative terms, and 
therefore easier to accommodate. 
At the same time, the problem of 
rural poverty will become more mana-
geable. The rural population is now 
much smaller than the urban population 
and so funds required to improve condi-
tions for the former are more likely to 
be a viable proportion of the total avail-
able. Those who cannot obtain remune-
rative employment in the rural areas can 
migrate to the cities, where, as noted, 
they now have a relatively slight impact, 
and this in itself should considerably 
alleviate poverty in the countryside. 
Indeed, the fact that the population is 
already relatively highly urbanized is 
likely to mean that conditions have not 
deteriorated in the rural areas; in Vene-
zuela the rural population has remained 
approximately constant in size since 
about 1940, so there has been no build-
up of pressure on the land. And so long 
as the natural increase is drained away 
by migration all efforts can go to impro-
ving levels of per capita welfare in the 
rural areas; nothing is required to accom-
modate greater numbers. All these 
considerations suggest that the problem 
of rural poverty is not likely to be as 
severe as in some regions, and should be 
easier to deal with. 
This is all true, of course, only if the 
bulk of the population which is now 
urban has been more or less effectively 
integrated into the urban money econo-
my; a simple shift from conditions of 
rural poverty to unintegrated urban 
poverty would not really mean changes 
of the sort implied here. But the mere 
fact that urbanization has gone so far is 
evidence that such integration has proba-
bly taken place. Otherwise it is unlikely 
that migration would have continued for 
so long on such a large scale. 
This, then, is something of a case of 
"unto him that hath shall be given". 
Once the mass transition from a basically 
rural to a basically urban society is 
successfully made, the difficulties 
—which are apt to be very severe in the 
transition period- are mitigated and at 
the same time resources available to deal 
with them are likely to become more 
generous, at least in relative terms. Much 
of the post-World War II period was one 
of such transition for Venezuela, and it 
seems probable that pressures associated 
with rapidly increasing numbers will 
moderate considerably in the years 
ahead. 
In addition to Venezuela, among the 
countries (or regions) analysed the South 
of Argentina and the developed region of 
Brazil are also characterized by high 
degrees of urbanization, although there 
are special characteristics in each of 
these cases and both are complicated by 
the existence of migration flows from 
other regions within the country. Migra-
tion may therefore continue to be some-
what more important, even though the 
rural populations within each region are 
smaller in relative terms than in Vene-
zuela. Nevertheless, much of the above 
discussion is also applicable to these two 
major regions. 
A somewhat different sort of pro-
blem which may persist in these highly 
urbanized regions is that related to the 
absolute size, as distinct from the rate of 
expansion, of some metropolitan areas. 
Given the type of economic growth 
which has characterized the region in the 
post-war period, there has often been a 
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considerable concentration in one or a 
few major cities, and some of these have 
reached a size where diseconomies of 
scale are now thought to present serious 
problems. In these circumstances it is 
possible that if a city continues to 
expand fairly rapidly the difficulties of 
coping with the expansion may increase, 
despite the fact that the rate of popula-
tion growth may be declining. The 
metropolitan areas of Buenos Aires and 
of Sao Paulo, for example, may well 
have grown to the point at which consi-
derations of this sort apply. 
The relative difficulty of tackling 
problems of regional disparity can also 
be viewed in the same light in which 
rural poverty was discussed above, and 
the contrast between the situations in 
Argentina and in Brazil can be noted 
here. In Argentina over 72 per cent of 
the 1970 high-income population was in 
the South (62.5 per cent in the urban 
South alone). The comparison between 
the South and the North is thus fairly 
similar to that between the urban and ru-
ral areas of Venezuela, and many of the 
same comments are applicable. A regio-
nal development programme in Argen-
tina appears manageable in these 
conditions and could probably be 
undertaken while at the same time a 
modern type of expansion was conti-
nued in the South itself. That is, the 
diversion of resources required would 
probably not be so great as to absorb all, 
or the bulk, of what was available. 
In Brazil, however, the situation is 
much less favourable. In 1970 less than 
28 per cent of the population was in the 
developed region (less than one-quarter 
in the developed urban area), and well 
over half still lived in the less-developed 
region. In these conditions the require-
ments of a full-scale regional develop-
ment programme might well preempt 
almost all the resources available, leaving 
1 i 11 le for continuing modern-type 
expansion in the developed region itself. 
That is, a different development style 
would probably be necessary to bring 
about short- or even intermediate-term 
regional change on a major scale. 
A second useful 'type' to analyse is a 
situation where around half the popula-
tion was urban at the beginning of the 
projection period. Brazil as a whole and 
the North of Argentina are fairly close to 
this position —in each case about 56 per 
cent of the population was urban in 
1970- but it can be better illustrated 
with the Brazilian data, the situation in 
the North of Argentina again being com-
plicated by regional migration flows. 
The bulk, if not all, of the popula-
tion increase will still occur in the urban 
areas, but if large-scale migration conti-
nues the impact on the cities will be 
considerably greater than in the 
Venezuela-type situation. In the third 
exercise, which assumes that rural-urban 
migration continues on about the same 
scale as in the recent past, the urban 
areas absorb practically all (94 per cent) 
of the population increase; and newly-
arriving migrants account for well over 
40 per cent of the total urban popula-
tion growth in the early 1970s and for 
nearly 30 per cent even at the end of the 
century.9 In the early 1970s migrants 
arriving during the course of a year 
would represent about 2 per cent of the 
entire urban population, a figure which 
9
 The reason why the relative importance 
of newly-arriving migrants does not decline 
faster lies in the assumption that urban fertility 
rates are substantially reduced over the period. 
Buth this assumption is adopted in the third 
exercise for all countries, so the figures are 
directly comparable to others cited in this 
connexion. 
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would fall to about 0.8 per cent by the 
end of the century. 
These figures are much higher than 
c those cited for Venezuela and indicate 
that rural-urban migration may for a 
good while remain a major factor in the 
growth of the cities in Brazil. The impact 
L will be fairly great, and for some time to 
come recent migrants will continue to be 
an important component of the urban 
population. 
Nevertheless, this impact has already 
begun to weaken, and in Brazil too the 
peak period of urban population growth 
is almost certainly over. Rural-urban 
migration has been substantial in Brazil 
in recent decades and has played an even 
bigger part in urban population growth 
than the simulation projections indicate 
it will in the future. During the 1950s 
the urban population increased at a peak 
rate of 5.5 per cent per annum; in the 
course of the 1960s this rate had already 
fallen to 4.8 per cent per annum and the 
third simulation projects an annual rate 
of 4.4 per cent during the early 1970s 
and then a continuing decline to 3.2 per 
cent at the end of the century. 
The pressures on the urban areas can 
therefore also be expected to decrease in 
the Brazilian type case in the years 
ahead, although less rapidly, and from 
less high extremes, than in Venezuela. 
This reflects the fact that the mass shift 
from a basically rural to a basically 
urban population was compressed into a 
shorter time-span in Venezuela, produ-
cing annual rates of urban population 
increase of well over 6 per cent from 
1940 to 1960, and then a sharper drop 
once the transition was well on its way 
to completion. In Brazil the shift has 
been more gradual, so that such high 
rates of urban population increase never 
occurred, and the decline has also been 
less abrupt.10 
This more gradual transition in Brazil 
is at least in part the result of the great 
regional differences within the country, 
and these require a major qualification 
of the above discussion. As a general 
rule, it is useful to indicate likely trends, 
and their implications, for a country 
with somewhat more than half its popu-
lation now urban. But in the specific 
case of Brazil this is of more limited 
relevance. As the degree of urbanization 
is very different in the major regions of 
the country, so likewise trends in the 
individual regions will be different, and 
it is these which are of primary impor-
tance. As is often the case for Latin 
America as a whole, the 'average' here is 
only a sum of disparate parts.11 
Finally, a third 'type' is a country 
whose population is still largely rural, 
and this can be illustrated with the data 
for El Salvador. As shown earlier, over 
60 per cent of the population was still 
rural in 1970, so that the transition to an 
urban society, with its implications for 
rapid expansion of the cities, is a possi-
bility still to come. Furthermore, this 
relatively low degree of urbanization has 
not changed much in recent decades; as 
early as 1930 about the same percentage 
of the population was urban (38.3 per 
cent) and in the intervening decades 
there has been no major rural-urban 
migration flow and rates of population 
increase in the rural and urban areas have 
10
 During the period of most rapid urban 
expansion in Brazil (1950 to 1970) the urban 
population rose from 36 per cent to nearly 56 
per cent of the total population. Over the equi-
valent 20-year period in Venezuela (1941 to 
1961) the urban population increased much 
more, from 39 per cent to 67 per cent of the 
total. 
11
 The analysis in the case study of Brazil is 
made largely in terms of the individual regions 
for this reason. 
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been much more similar than in most of 
the region. Rapid urbanization, should it 
begin, would therefore also represent a 
sharp break with past trends. 
The first important point to note is 
that a relatively low degree of urbaniza-
tion means greater uncertainty about the 
distribution of the future population 
increase as between the rural and the 
urban areas. If past trends continue, the 
bulk of it will be in the rural area 
-which is not true of any other country 
analysed- but to the extent migration 
increases it will shift to the urban area. 
Again, the maintenance of past trends 
will make rates of population growth 
fairly similar, and high, in both areas; 
but if there is substantial migration the 
rate of increase will drop sharply in the 
rural areas and rise sharply in the cities. 
Thus migration flows become a more 
central variable in this sort of situation 
and must be watched even more closely 
for policy purposes. 
Given large-scale migration, here as 
in the other type situations, the great 
bulk of the population increase would be 
in the urban area, and it is there that 
facilities would have to be provided. But 
the impact of such migration on the 
urban area would be greater in this case. 
If the projections of the third exercise 
are again considered, newly-arriving 
migrants account for over half of the 
total urban population increase in the 
early 1970s and still represent about 30 
per cent of it at the end of the century. 
Migrants arriving during the course of a 
year total more than 3 per cent of the 
existing urban population in the early 
1970s, and although it declines steadily 
the proportion is still 1.2 per cent at the 
end of the century. These figures are far 
higher than those of the corresponding 
simulation for Venezuela and substan-
tially exceed those for Brazil, particu-
larly during the first half of the 
projection period, indicating the more 
powerful potential impact of large-scale 
migration on this sort of situation. Here 
the composition of the urban population 
would shift, but in a way opposite to its 
probable evolution in Venezuela. Recent 
migrants would be a rising proportion of 
the total for some time to come, and 
would remain a major element in the 
cities until well past the end of the 
century. 
As large-scale migration would repre-
sent a break with past trends in El 
Salvador, the pressure on the cities 
would sharply increase. The annual rate 
of urban population growth has been 
fairly rapid in the recent past (around 
3H per cent) but with large -scale migra-
tion it would rise to an average of 5 per 
cent for the period 1970-2000 as a 
whole. At the beginning of the large-
scale migration it would be around 6 per 
cent, and then decline, as the shift to the 
cities progressed, to about 4 per cent at 
the end of the century.12 
A change of this magnitude, with the 
urban population rising from less than 
40 per cent to about two-thirds of the 
total over a thirty-year period, would 
12
 These projected rates of increase are based 
on the assumptions of the third simulation, and 
the rates could be even higher. Although large, 
the migration assumed in that exercise is less 
than has often occurred elsewhere, and the 
rural population continues to increase at an 
average rate of 1.1 per cent per annum to the 
end of the century. The third exercise also 
assumes a sharp drop in urban fertility rates, 
which of course reduces the rate of increase. In 
an exercise designed to show the extremes (the 
rural population is held approximately constant 
and there is only a small decline in fertility 
rates) the average rate of urban population 
increase to the end of the century is 5.6 per 
cent per annum. 
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not be particularly unusual in the region. 
It would be similar to the speed of urba-
nization in Brazil in recent years, for 
example, and would be less rapid than 
the transition which occurred in Vene-
zuela during the post-war period.13 But, 
given the high fertility rates prevailing in 
most of the region, the transition will of 
necessity involve a spell of very rapid 
urban population growth, with the resul-
ting severe pressures for employment, 
essential infrastructure and social servi-
ces in the urban areas, which would be, 
at best, difficult to cope with. This may 
well be a period which assumes crisis 
characteristics, and is likely to be crucial 
to success or failure in establishing a 
reasonably integrated modern economy. 
Herein lies one of the reasons why popu-
lation trends during the transition phase 
are among the most important results 
obtained from the simulation exercises. 
Lastly, where the population is still 
largely rural, the problem of rural pover-
ty is an extremely difficult one to 
resolve. As most of the population may 
well be involved, the resources required 
are likely to bulk very large in the total 
available to the economy, and in these 
circumstances it will probably be 
impossible to seek a basic solution to the 
rural poverty problem while at the same 
time pursuing a growth programme cen-
tred on a modern-type urban economy. 
1
 In Brazil the urban population rose from 
36 per cent of the total in 1950 to 56 per cent 
in 1970, and rates of increase in the urban and 
rural populations were similar to those projec-
ted in the third exercise for El Salvador. In 
Venezuela the shift projected over 30 years for 
El Salvador occurred in only 20 (the urban 
population increased from less than 40 per cent 
of the population in 1941 to over two-thirds in 
1961); rates of population growth were highei 
in the cities and there was essentially no expan-
sion of the rural population. 
In effect, a choice may have to be made 
between less satisfactory alternatives. 
Priority for the rural poverty problem 
may well necessitate a different style of 
development, oriented less towards 
modern-ftype industrial production and 
more towards the rural areas. This could 
be regarded either as a long-term alterna-
tive, or as an intermediate-term solution, 
in the latter case with the expectation 
that it would result in a fairly rapid 
decline in rural fertility rates so that, 
with slower population growth, the shift 
to a more modern urban economy could 
then be undertaken more gradually and 
therefore with less severe pressures. 
Alternatively, the transition to a 
modern-type urban economy could be 
undertaken at once, with essentially all 
resources concentrated on making the 
transition successful and the rural poverty 
problem left either to be resolved by the 
transfer of population itself, or to be 
dealt with later. As noted, neither alter-
native is completely satisfactory.14 
The simulation projections provide 
data on another issue related to urbani-
zation which is worth noting: the extent 
to which the process reduces fertility 
rates and hence the rate of population 
increase at the national level. Since ferti-
14
 This discussion implicitly involves one of 
the factors which will probably be important in 
determining how difficult the transition to an 
urban society is likely to be: the population 
density at the time the transition begins. If the 
rural areas are only sparsely populated -as was 
the case in Venezuela, for example— then the 
problem of rural poverty is likely to be less 
severe. It can more safely be ignored to concen-
trate on the pressures in the burgeoning cities, 
and will be easier to deal with later. If densities 
are already rather high in the rural areas -as in 
El Salvador- then the problem is likely to be 
more serious and the whole transition process 
more difficult to handle. 
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lity rates are in general lower in tne 
cities, if migrants adopt urban practices 
this will reduce the number of births, 
and so urbanization is sometimes regar-
ded as the most effective and practical 
way of reducing the rate of population 
growth. Past trends in the countries 
included in this study do not offer much 
support to this hypothesis. In Venezuela 
there has been a mass shift to the cities 
in recent decades, but this has not been 
accompanied by any substantial decline 
in fertility rates at the national level. In 
Brazil there has been a somewhat smal-
ler, but still very considerable, shift 
toward the areas with lower fertility 
rates (the cities and the more developed 
regions), but again this has brought with 
it no significant decrease in the overall 
national fertility rate. Other factors have 
no doubt been present, but these trends 
do not encourage the belief that urbani-
zation alone is likely to slow down the 
rapid rates of population increase. 
The potential numerical impact can 
be shown in two differing cases 
-Venezuela and El Salvador- with data 
from the simulation exercises.15 Vene-
zuela represents a country already quite 
highly urbanized and so it is not surpri-
sing that the impact of further migration 
is limited, even though fertility rates are 
15
 For these two countries an additional 
simulation exercise was carried out to determine 
the impact of mass migration in conditions 
where otherwise, particularly with respect to 
fertility rates, there was little change from the 
1970 situation. In this exercise, with the excep-
tion of migration rates, all variables are the 
same as in the first exercise. Any difference in 
results is therefore exclusively due to migration, 
this being very limited in the first exercise and 
very large, in relation to the rural population, in 
the additional exercise. 
estimated to be nearly 40 per cent higher 
in the rural than in the urban area. Both 
the rate of increase and the total popula-
tion at the end of the century are closely 
similar in the two exercises.16 
El Salvador is still primarily rural at 
the starting-point of the projections, 
however, and the difference between the i 
degree of urbanization in the two exerci-
ses is very marked,17 so the differential 
effect on population growth is predic-
tably great. In the first exercise the total 
population at the end of the century, 
with 1970 = 100, is 280 and the popula-
tion is then increasing at the very rapid 
annual rate of 3.6 per cent, whereas in 
the special exercise the figures are only 
263 and 3.3 per cent, respectively. The 
impact of urbanization is, as noted, 
important, but even with a massive 
population shift of the sort projected 
here, and on the assumption that 
migrants immediately adopt urban prac-
tices, it is clearly limited. Urbanization 
alone cannot be expected to reduce the 
rate of population increase to moderate 
proportions in most of the region; that 
will occur only when fertility rates 
within the different areas fall below their 
generally high present levels. 
16
 Given 1970 = 100, the population is 248 
at the end of the century with limited migra-
tion and 245 with large-scale migration. The 
annual rates of population increase are 2.79 per 
cent and 2.74 per cent, respectively. This 
simply confirms numerically the intuitively 
obvious conclusion that in a population which 
is already largely urban further urbanization 
alone will not have a significant impact on total 
fertility rates. 
17
 In the first exercise the proportion of 
the population which is urban rises only from 
39.4 per cent in 1970 to 43.6 per cent at the 
end of the century. In the special experiment it 
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(c) Projected trends in age structures 
Currently prevailing age structures 
have already been discussed in compara-
tive terms, and the principal implications 
noted, so that here it is necessary to deal 
only with likely trends to the end of the 
\ century. It is the trend in fertility rates 
which largely determines the age struc-
ture, and so a comparison of simulation 
exercises with differing assumptions 
about fertility rates will show the limits 
within which changes can be expected to 
occur. This means comparing the results 
of the first exercise (little change from 
the 1970 situation) with those of the 
second (large-scale migration toward 
areas with lower fertility rates and sharp 
declines in fertility rates in the urban 
areas) (see table 16). 
In the first exercise only moderate 
changes take place up to the end of the 
century. In Argentina there is a pronoun-
ced increase in the relative importance of 
the over-65 group; in Venezuela, and to' 
a lesser extent in Brazil, a decline in the 
relative importance of children is offset 
by an increase in that of the adult age 
groups; and in El Salvador that of teen-
agers and young adults is stepped up 
slightly.18 With the continuing excep-
tion of A rgentina, populations will 
remain very young if fertility rates do 
not fall much lower. 
rises to 76.9 per cent. That is, there is a diffe-
rential shift of fully one-third of the total 
population. 
18
 The changes are different in the several 
countries mostly because of differing past 
trends in the population parameters, the results 
of which are now working their way through 
the age structure. There are also some discre-
pancies due to the extent of the decline in 
fertility rates assumed in the first exercise for 
the various countries. 
In the second exercise the shift in all 
countries is much greater, with the rela-
tive importance of children declining 
substantially and that of the adult age 
groups increasing. But, Argentina apart, 
populations will remain quite young 
even if there should be a sharp and 
sustained downward movement in fertili-
ty rates. At the end of the century less 
than one-quarter of the population in 
the other countries will be 40 or more 
years of age, whereas in Argentina one-
third of the population was already in 
that category in 1970, and in an even-
tually stable zero-growth population the 
proportion would be about 45 per cent. 
Since the bulk of the age range at the 
end of the century represents those 
already born in 1970, whose numbers 
are therefore essentially unaffected by 
the assumptions of the projections, the 
differences between age structures in the 
first and in the second exercises are due 
very largely to differences in the num-
bers of children and adolescents at the 
end of the century, which are very great. 
With the rapidly falling fertility rates 
assumed in the second exercise, the 
number of infants (the 0-4 age group) at 
the end of the century in Venezuela and 
El Salvador is not much more than half 
the number projected in the first exercise, 
and in Brazil less than two-thirds. The 
number of children (5-14 years of age) at 
the end of the century in the second 
exercise is only about two-thirds the 
number projected in the first exercise in 
Venezuela and El Salvador, and about 
three-quarters in Brazil.19 With the adult 
population more or less pre-determined, 
it is these sharp possible variations in the 
19
 The differences are less in Brazil largely 
because of regional disparities in that country 
and the consequently somewhat different 
pattern of assumptions used in the exercises. 
Table 16 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PROJECTED AGE STRUCTURES 
(Percentage distribution) 
Age group 
1970 2000 (exercise I) 2000 (exercise II) 
Argen- „ ., Vene- El Argen- _ _, Vene- El Argen- _ ., Vene- EI 
. Brazil , _ , , f Brazil , _ , , . Brazil , _ , , tina zuela Salvador tina zuela Salvador tina zuela Salvador 
0-4 10.1 16.3 16.9 18.4 9.7 15.3 14.8 18.1 7.4 11.7 9.7 11.7 
5-14 19.1 26.4 29.4 28.6 18.0 25.0 25.5 27.9 15.5 22.0 21.5 23.5 
15-19 9.0 10.8 10.7 10.2 8.4 10.2 10.7 10.6 7.9 9.9 10.6 10.Í 
20-39 28.5 27.1 25.1 25.6 28.4 28.3 28.9 26.9 30.2 31.5 33.5 32.7 
40-64 26.2 16.3 15.0 14.0 25.4 17.1 16.0 13.4 27.9 20.0 19.6 17.2 
65 and over 7.2 3.1 2.9 3.2 10.2 4.2 4.1 3.2 11.1 4.9 5.0 4.1 
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number of children which account for 
the different age structures in the two 
exercises. 
There are already great differences 
in the age structures from one area to 
another within each country, and these 
can be intensified by large-scale migra-
tion. As it is mostly the young who 
migrate, this will tend, over the period of 
the projection, to reduce the relative 
importance of young adults in the areas 
from which migrants come (primarily 
the rural areas) and to increase it in the 
recipient areas. Different trends in fertili-
ty rates can of course cause the age 
structures to diverge further. The possi-
ble extent of such differences can be 
shown by the age structures at the end 
of the century projected on the basis of 
the assumptions of great change in the 
second exercise. Figures for selected 
areas in each country are given in table 
17. Too much weight cannot be attached 
to these figures because of the way in 
which migration is calculated in the 
model, but they do illustrate the striking 
extent of the divergencies which might 
arise. 
In general the proportion of chil-
dren will be much higher in the rural 
areas and the proportion of active adults, 
especially young adults, much lower. A 
special situation to note is the high per-
centage of older people in the rural 
South of Argentina. A fairly mature 
population structure has evolved in that 
region, and continuing large-scale migra-
tion will drain away much of the 
younger population, so that older 
people, who tend to remain, will become 
an increasingly large proportion of the 
total. All the figures shown illustrate the 
Table 17 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: AGE STRUCTURES IN 2000 AS 
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changes that could occur with the assump-
tions of extreme change adopted in the 
second exercise; in the other simulations 
the divergencies between areas are less 
striking, but they are always substantial. 
There are several important implica-
tions of these potential changes in age 
structure. The first is that the relative 
size of the dependent population (those 
less than 15 and over 65) will generally 
diminish somewhat, how much being 
conditional upon trends in fertility rates. 
In Argentina the dependent population 
in 1970 was of the same relative impor-
tance as it would be in an eventually 
stable zero-growth population (some-
what more than 36 per cent of the 
total), and this proportion will not 
change greatly. But in all the other 
countries the proportion was much 
larger (nearly 46 per cent in Brazil and 
around half in Venezuela and El Salva-
dor), and can be expected to decline, 
perhaps quite substantially. There are 
again marked differences from one area 
to another, with dependency ratios a 
good deal higher in the rural areas and in 
the poorer regions. The likely range at 
the end of the century can be illustrated 
with the results of the first exercise 
(little change from the 1970 situation) 
and the third (considerable change, but 
less extreme than that assumed in the 
second exercise), selected figures from 
which are shown in table 18. 
In addition to the overall figures, it 
is important to note the composition of 
this dependent population. In Argentina, 
in 1970 the ovcr-65 group was already 
somewhat more than 7 per cent of the 
entire population, and about one-fifth of 
the dependent population itself; and if 
fertility rates decline further these figu-
res could rise to close to 11 per cent and 
to 30 per cent, respectively, at the end 
of the century. The elderly population is 
thus beginning to assume considerable 
importance in Argentina.20 In the other 
countries, however, the over-65 group 
was only about 3 per cent of the popula-
tion in 1970 (6 per cent to 7 per cent of 
the dependent population), and although 
these proportions will rise, it does not 
exceed 5 per cent of the population at 
the end of the century (less than 14 per 
cent of the dependent population) in 
any simulation. Not until the next 
century will the elderly group become a 
major part of the dependent population 
in these countries, and in most of the 
rest of Latin America as well. 
The principal consequence of the 
generally large size of the dependent 
population is simply that each member 
of the labour force will have a greater 
average number of dependants to 
support, so that at any given labour pro-
ductivity level per capita incomes for the 
population as a whole are lower. This is a 
major factor in the relatively high per 
capital income levels in Argentina, and in 
the other countries as dependency ratios 
decline per capita incomes will tend to 
rise. It is thus that a fall in fertility rates 
can have an immediate impact: there are 
fewer children to support per member of 
the active population and so per capita 
incomes improve. 
There are also policy implications 
relating to the measures which will have 
to be taken to look after the dependent 
population. In Argentina a major consi-
deration will be the provision of social 
services and health facilities for the 
elderly, but in the other countries it will 
very largely be children's needs that have 
20
 As a point of reference, in an eventually 
stable zero-growth population the over-65 
group would be about 15 per cent of the total, 
and well over 40 per cent of the dependent 
population. 
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Table 18 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
DEPENDENT POPULATION, 1970 AND 2000 
(Percentage of total population) 





















































to be met. Here educational facilities are 
a permanent concern in the social area, 
and the most important issue is therefore 
how fast the primary-school-age popula-
tion is likely to increase. 
The 5 to 14 age group can be used as 
an estimate of the primary-school-age 
population, and the figures presented 
earlier show that the relative importance 
of this group will decline in all countries 
-moderately even in the first exercise 
and much more if there is a big drop in 
fertility rates. Hence this age group will 
increase less rapidly than the population 
as a whole in the years ahead. At the 
national level the period of most rapid 
increase in the primary-school-age popu-
lation has already passed in all the 
countries analysed, so that, in the aggre-
gate, the often severe pressures for 
school facilities experienced in the 
recent past will presumably be eased in 
the future. But the extent of the relief 
varies greatly, and it is often the pressure 
in particular areas rather than the aggre-
gate which is most exacting, so care must 
be taken in interpreting such a sweeping, 
although still very important, general-
ization. In addition to the clear-cut 
differences from one area to another 
there is often considerable uncertainty 
here, so that for purposes of educational 
planning trends will have to be closely 
followed if effective provision is to be 
made. 
At one extreme, the rate of increase 
in the primary-school-age population in 
Argentina had already fallen to about 1 
per cent per annum during the 1960s, 
and will slow down somewhat more 
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during the 1970s. If fertility rates conti-
nue to decline, this age group will then 
remain approximately constant from 
1980 to the end of the century, so that 
no additional expansion of primary 
school facilities will be required on this 
score. This would be a situation similar 
to that experienced in a number of the 
advanced industrial countries in recent 
years. But as the primary-school-age 
population is quickly affected by trends 
in fertility rates uncertainty is intro-
duced, although less in Argentina than 
elsewhere, and if there is no further 
significant reduction of fertility rates the 
school-age population will increase some-
what faster again after 1980.21 
The primary-school-age population 
will continue to expand much more 
rapidly in the other countries, and the 
rate may fluctuate substantially. This can 
be illustrated by past and projected 
trends in Venezuela, figures for which 
are shown in table 19. 
As shown, the peak was reached 
during the second half of the 1950s, 
when this age group increased at the 
extremely rapid annual rate of 5.7 per 
cent The rate has declined since, and 
will drop sharply to less than 2 per cent 
during the 1970s. From that relatively 
low level it will rise a good deal during 
the 1980s, and turn downward again 
during the last decade of the century, 
the magnitude of the fluctuation depend-
ing on the trend of fertility rates.22 
21
 In the first exercise (little change from 
the 1970 situation) the 5-14 year age group 
increases at the rate of 1.3 per cent per annum 
during the 1980s and then, somewhat more 
slowly again, by 1 per cent per annum during 
the last decade of the century. 
22
 These fluctuations result from the 
nature of the underlying population parameters 
and from the way in which the transition to 
higher rates of population increase occurs. 
In addition to the variations in 
growth at the national level, there are 
major disparities in the extent to which 
the increment, and the need for primary 
school facilities, are likely to be concen-
trated in particular areas: and so the rate 
of increase is also likely to differ greatly 
from one area to another. At one 
extreme, the rural primary school popu-
lation in Argentina decreased substan-
tially during the 1960s, and if migration 
continues on a similar scale the decline 
will continue. There was also a signifi-
cant reduction in the developed rural 
area in Brazil, and growth was only slight 
in the rural areas in Venezuela, so that 
here too continuing migration will 
involve little or no expansion of this 
group. In such circumstances no increase 
in school places is required, except 
perhaps to improve attendance ratios, 
and available funds can be used entirely 
to raise standards. 
At the other extreme, the cities must 
often clearly absorb the great bulk of the 
increase, and growth rates in some 
circumstances can be very high. To cite 
the most striking instances, the urban 
primary-school-age population in Vene-
zuela was increasing at a peak rate of 
close to 10 per cent per annum during 
the late 1950s, when the rapid expansion 
of this age group in the country as a 
whole coincided with the mass move-
ment to the cities. The rate then fell 
fairly quickly, and, as most of the popu-
lation shift to the cities has already 
occurred, the increase in the urban 
primary school population in Venezuela 
will in the future remain below 4 per 
cent per annum. Within that limit there 
will be considerable fluctuations from 
one period to another, and much will 
depend on the trend in fertility rates. 
Growth rates of this age group in the 
urban areas of Brazil were also very high 
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during the 1960s (for the decade as a 
whole they ranged from 5-5 per cent to 
6.8 per cent per annum in the different 
regions of the country) and will remain 
quite high to the end of the century. But 
the peak rates of urban increase in 
Brazil, as in Venezuela, have passed, and 
the pressures for primary school facilities 
in the cities, which have often been very 
great, will probably be substantially 
eased in the years ahead. In the countries 
here considered, the only urban area 
which might well experience a marked 
intensification of the pressures for 
primary schooling is that of El Salvador. 
In El Salvador the population is still basi-
cally rural, and large-scale migration to 
the cities could increasingly accelerate 
the growth rate of the urban primary-
school-age population. 
It must be stressed that there is 
clearly a good deal of variation among 
the different areas. Both the existing 
situation and the trend are likely to be 
quite different from one area to another, 
and there is considerable room for uncer-
tainty because of possible changes in 
fertility rates and/or migration flows. 
Adequate educational planning will 
require a careful a is of conditions in 
the different areas of the country, and 
trends will need to be followed closely; 
they are unlikely to be steady and can 
change relatively quickly for this age 
group. 
The other age group whose relative 
importance will probably alter a good 
deal in most countries, and with implica-
tions that require noting, is the young 
adult group (20-39 years of age). Argen-
tina is again an exception, but in the 
other countries this age group will gain 
in relative importance, even if fertility 
rates do not decrease much, and if they 
do, the increase may be very substan-
tial.23 The number of young adults will 
therefore be growing faster —perhaps 
much faster- than the population as a 
whole in most countries. This reflects 
the fact that the initial bulge, which 
began with the transition to higher rates 
of population growth, and which, as 
pointed out above, often resulted in very 
high rates of increase in the child popula-
tion during the late 1950s and 1960s, is 
now reaching the young adult age group; 
consequently, this age group will expand 
rapidly in most countries at least until 
the last years of this century.24 
Again considerable variation is likely 
from one area to another within a 
country, particularly if there are large-
scale migration flows. As this group is 
23
 In Argentina the fall in the relative 
importance of children tends to be offset 
primarily by a rise in that of the elderly. If 
there is a major decline in fertility rates the 
relative importance of young adults will of 
course increase, but no more than that of the 
older adult group. The situation is also some-
what different in Brazil. As in Venezuela and 
El Salvador, the proportion represented by 
young adults will rise, perhaps substantially; 
but in Brazil the 40-64 year age group will 
increase approximately as much as young adults 
in relative terms. 
24
 The projected growth rates of this age 
group in the different countries to the end of 
































The rates are of course the same in all 
exercises until 1990. Only after that date do 
differing assumptions about fertility rates begin 
to affect this age group. 
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Table 19 
VENEZUELA: AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE IN THE 
PRIMARY-SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION 
(Percentage) 












Projected rates of increase 







heavily affected, such migration can well 
result in an absolute fall in the number 
of young adults in some rural areas, with 
big counterpart increases in the urban 
areas to which the migrants move. In 
those exercises which assume large-scale 
migration, rates of increase of 5 per cent 
to 6 per cent per annum are projected 
for several of the urban areas during the 
first half of the 30-year period. 
There are two major implications of 
this rapid future increase in the young 
adult population. First, since this is the 
age group with the highest age-specific 
fertility rates, a rapid rise in its numbers 
will tend to mean a rapid rise in the 
number of births, and hence a relatively 
high growth rate for the population as a 
whole. So this aspect of the age structure 
is a basic determinant of an accelerated 
rate of population increase in m ost 
countries, at least up to the end of the 
century, regardless of assumptions about 
fertility rates. 
The impact is clear from the simula-
tion exercises. In the first exercise only a 
slow decline in fertility rates is assumed, 
and even this is largely, or entirely, negated 
by the rapid numerical increase in the 
fertile age groups: in Venezuela the rate of 
population growth rises marginally during 
1975-1985 and then gradually sinks until 
the end of the century; in Brazil it remains 
practically constant throughout the period 
of the projections; and in El Salvador it 
rises steadily up to the end of the century. 
At the other extreme, even with the rather 
unrealistically large decreases in fertility 
rates assumed in the second exercise, the 
projected rates of population increase 
remain in general very high until the last 
decade of the century. 
The second major implication is that 
young adults tend to account for about 
half the total labour force, so that the 
rapid expansion of this age group is a 
basic factor in the expected enlargement 
of the labour force itself. 
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(d) The labour force 
(i) Projected trends. In most of 
Latin America the labour force will 
increase rapidly at least to the end of the 
century, and the simulation exercises 
clearly demonstrate the certainty of this 
central conclusion: despite widely diver-
gent underlying assumptions the projec-
tions do not differ greatly from one 
exercise to another. A general impression 
of likely trends, and possible variations 
in them, can be given by comparing the 
projections of the first and of the second 
exercises (see table 20).2S 
Here, as in most other aspects rela-
ting to population, Argentina is clearly a 
case apart. The labour force in Argentina 
is likely to increase at rates ranging 
around 1 A per cent per annum during 
the next few decades, and at the end of 
the century the total labour force will be 
perhaps 50 per cent larger than it was in 
1970. This rate of increase is higher than 
that characteristic of most of the high-
income industrial countries, but it is 
closer to their type of situation than to 
the situation which will prevail almost 
throughout the rest of Latin America. 
In the other countries analysed the 
rates of increase in the labour force will 
be 3 per cent per annum or higher in the 
decades ahead, and at the end of the 
century the total labour force is likely to 
be l>h or 23A times its 1970 size. These 
rates of growth, and the total increase to 
25
 The first exercise assumes little change 
from the 1970 situation, while the second exer-
cise assumes great change. In addition to the 
different assumptions about population para-
meters which have been noted before, the first 
exercise assumes little change in labour partici-
pation rates, while the second assumes that in 
the urban areas these shift to the rates which 
prevailed in France in 1968. 
which they give rise during the 30-year 
period of the projection, are very high, 
and will offer a vitally important 
challenge to the modern-type industrial 
development process which characterizes 
the economies of the region. Histori-
cally, during the phase of industrializa-
tion in the now highly industrialized 
countries the labour force was increasing 
much more slowly, and even so the 
employment problem was for long 
periods often critical. In much of 
Western Europe, for example, reasonably 
full integration has been achieved only in 
the post-World War II years, with their 
unusually favourable record of growth 
and structural change; and during that 
period the labour force has been expan-
ding at a rate of around 1 per cent per 
annum in most countries. It is clear that 
with the much higher rates of increase 
which will prevail in most of Latin 
America the problem of adequate 
employment opportunities will remain a 
central issue at least until well into the 
next century.26 
26
 It is worth emphasizing the importance 
of these much higher rates of increase, and this 
can be done with a simple numerical exercise. 
The problem, in so far as it relates to employ-
ment, is to absorb the labour force into the 
modern, high-productivity and high-income 
areas of the economy. This has generally been 
associated with a shift in the structure of the 
labour force away from the low-income agricul-
tural sector and toward industrial and high-
income service activities. Very large switchovers 
of this sort have occurred in many of the high-
income industrial countries during the post-
World War II period, reflecting the strong and 
continuous industrial expansion. The change 
which has occurred in three countries 
considered to have achieved a great deal during 
this period are noted below. With respect to 
Western Europe, reference is often made to the 
Italian and the West German 'economic 
miracles'; and Japan's case is commonly cited as 
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It has already been pointed out that 
these very high rates of increase in most 
countries are a relatively recent pheno-
menon. The labour force has probably 
been expanding at mounting speed 
throughout the post-World War II 
period, a process which may reach a 
climax during the 1970s, whereafter 
the outstanding success story of this type. 
From 1955 to 1970, which was a time of very 
concentrated change in these countries (in Italy 
the annual growth rate of the gross product was 
close to 6 per cent, in West Germany slightly 
more than 6 per cent, and in Japan nearly 11 









of the labour force 
Agri- Indus- Servi-
culture try ces 
42.2 32.1 25.7 
17.2 44.4 38.4 
22.8 43.9 33.3 
8.7 47.0 44.3 
43.8 27.3 28.9 
19.8 34.1 46.1 
The shift out of agriculture and into the 
higher-income industrial and services sectors is 
striking in each country. But this must be 
viewed in relation to labour force growth rates 
in the years 1955-1970: in Italy the size of the 
labour force contracted slightly over the period, 
while in West Germany it increased at the rate 
of 0.7 per cent per annum, and in Japan by 1.5 
per cent per annum. 
These rates are much lower than any that 
will prevail in Latin America. If it is hypothe-
tically assumed that the same process of 
expansion and the same absorption of labour 
into the industrial and services sectors would 
occur, but that the total labour force would be 
expanding at a rate of 3 per cent per annum, 
with any residual increase remaining in the 
agricultural sector, the results would be very 
rates of increase may decline somewhat 
in many countries. As the above figures 
show, this is not a certainty: somewhat 
divergent trends occur in the different 
countries, and with the adoption of 
different assumptions. But these fluctua-
tions in the rate of increase over the 
30-year period of the projections are of 
different. On this hypothesis, in both Italy and 
West Germany the proportion of the labour 
force in agriculture would increase (to 46.9 per 
cent in Italy and to 35 per cent in West Germa-
ny), while the proportion in industry and 
services would dwindle, although of course there 
would be the same absolute increase as actually 
occurred in these sectors. In the Japan-type 
expansion the much higher growth rate would 
still produce a moderate decline in the propor-
tion of the labour force in agriculture (to 35.8 
per cent), while the proportion in the industrial 
sector would remain constant, and there would 
be an offsetting increase in the proportion 
engaged in services. Hence, with the rates of 
increase in the labour force to be expected in 
most of Latin America in the decades ahead, an 
'economic miracle' of the Italian or West 
German variety would not improve the structure 
of the labour force; the proportion under-
employed (for which the agricultural sector is 
here used as a proxy) would actually rise. Even 
a 'miracle' of the Japanese kind would lead 
only to a moderate improvement: if the labour 
force were increasing by 3 per cent per annum 
(and it will do so even faster in some countries), 
the proportion underemployed would decline 
from 43.8 per cent to 35.8 per cent over a 
15-year period and there would be no increase 
in the proportion in the industrial sector. 
As noted earlier, modern-type industrial 
expansion does not readily absorb large quanti-
ties of labour. If the labour force is increasing 
rapidly, the absorption of most of it into the 
high-productivity sectors is apt to require 
extremely high economic growth rates. In the 
past such shifts have been achieved in circum-
stances where the labour force was increasing at 
much more moderate rates. 
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secondary importance. The main conclu- likely to increase a good deal more 
sion must be that, at least to the end of quickly than the population as a whole. 
the century, the labour force will conti- The young adult group will expand parti-
nue to grow very rapidly in most cularly fast, especially during the 1970s 
countries. and 1980s, and as noted this age group 
Before examining in more detail the alone tends to account for around half 
different aspects and implications of of the total labour force. The second 
these trends it is important to clarify the most important group in the labour 
two major factors underlying the aggre- force is that of more mature adults 
gate increase, and the relative impor- (40-64 years of age), and this group too 
tance of each. The first factor is simply can be expected to increase more rapidly 
the growth of the population in the than the population as a whole. This 
active age groups in the different rapid increase in the population in the 
countries. As has been discussed in some active age groups will alone ensure a very 
detail earlier, in most countries the total large expansion of the labour force, irres-
population will increase rapidly over the pective of any reasonable assumptions 
period of the projections, and the relative which might be made about labour parti-
importance of the active age groups as cipation rates. 
a whole is likely to rise substantially: (ii) Labour participation rates. The 
that is, the population in these groups is second major factor underlying the 
Table 20 
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Table 21 






































































































aggregate increase consists in possible 
changes in labour participation rates, and 
although it is clearly the less important 
of the two, it can also have a strong 
impact in some circumstances. The situa-
tion here is a good deal more complica-
ted, and 'reasonable' assumptions to be 
used in the projections are more difficult 
to define. 
Perhaps the first point to note in a 
more detailed analysis is that labour 
participation rates at the national level 
must be treated with caution, as they 
combine the rural and urban population, 
and participation rates in the two areas 
are likely to be quite different. Male 
participation rates are generally signifi-
cantly higher at all ages (but particularly 
for adolescents and for older men) in the 
rural areas, where female participation 
rates, by contrast, tend to be much 
lower. These differences probably reflect 
at least in part registration conventions 
in the rural areas -nearly all men regard 
themselves as members of the labour force, 
while women do not- and so rural par-
ticipation rates, and projected changes in 
those rates, are probably less meaningful 
from the present point of view. For this 
reason, as well as because greater impor-
tance is usually attached to the problem 
of urban employment, owing to the gene-
ral social and political context in which it 
arises, the following discussion concen-
trates on labour participation rates in the 
urban areas. 
It is female labour participation rates 
which present the greatest scope for 
possible change and so can most affect 
the increase in the labour force. Since 
they are quite low in Latin America, 
even in the cities, if more women should 
enter the labour force, for whatever 
reason, the impact might possibly be 
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quite significant. Even within Latin 
America, however, there is a good dea! 
of variation from one country and region 
to another, and it is best to present the 
estimated age-specific participation rates 
in the different urban areas before 
proceeding; the rates prevailing in France 
in 1968 are shown for purposes of 
comparison.27 
Participation rates for adolescents 
and for elderly women are often some-
what higher in the Latin American urban 
areas than in France; but for all the rest 
of the age range they are much lower, so 
there is great scope for an increase in the 
number of working women in all the 
countries analysed. How large an 
increase might actually occur depends of 
course on the reasons for the present low 
participation rates and the extent to 
which anticipated changes might alter 
that situation; and this is very difficult 
to specify. One important reason for the 
relatively small proportion of working 
women in Latin America may simply be 
a lack of employment opportunities; the 
availability of more and/or better oppor-
tunities might alone suffice to raise 
commensurately the numbers in the 
labour force. A comparison of labour 
participation rates in the different areas 
does not give much support to this hypo-
27
 The French rates are for the country as a 
whole rather than for the urban area. They 
were used in the simulation exercises as a possi-
ble 'target' toward which rates might move. The 
French rates were chosen as they occur in a 
diversified, industrialized urban economy, 
where the social structure is perhaps closer to 
that of Latin America than in the case of some 
of the other high-income economies of Western 
Europe. These rates therefore provide an indica-
tion of the direction in which labour parti-
cipation rates might move as industrialization 
advanced in the region. As will be noted in the 
text, however, a great deal of uncertainty exists 
in this area. 
thesis, however. In Argentina, for 
example, female participation rates are 
somewhat higher in the urban South up 
to the age of 25; but for women over 25 
they are higher in the urban North, and 
it is unlikely that there are greater 
opportunities in the North than in the 
South. Further, for the female popula-
tion as a whole the highest rates are 
found in El Salvador, where income 
levels are lower and opportunities proba-
bly less attractive than in most of the 
other urban areas analysed. The opposite 
economic motive might even be adduced 
to explain these comparative figures: 
that is, women tend to work primarily 
from necessity. But this hypothesis in its 
turn is contradicted by the fact that, up 
to the age of 50, the lowest rates occur 
in the less-developed urban area of 
Brazil, where income levels are lower 
than in most other urban areas and the 
pressure to work, therefore, presumably 
greater. 
Both these factors, plus many others, 
probably play a part in the determina-
tion of female participation rates. The 
fairly clear conclusion to be drawn from 
an examination of participation rates in 
different countries is that these are to a 
major extent a reflection of the entire, 
and quite specific, socio-cultural environ-
ment. As such they may vary widely 
from one urban area to another, and it is 
unlikely that any simplified set of econo-
mic or other factors can satisfactorily 
explain these differences or make it possi-
ble to predict future trends.28 
8
 This can be even more graphically illus-
trated by noting female participation rates in 
countries outside Latin America, where extreme 
variations can be found. A number of these, 
admittedly picked to show divergencies, follow 
(the figures are taken from the ILO Labour 
Statistics Yearbook). 
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Considered in these terms, the gene-
ral structure of female participation rates 
in Latin America is worth noting. In all 
of the countries analysed participation 
rates are highest for very young women 
(reaching their peak in the 20-24 year 
age group), and then decline quite rapid-
ly after the age of 30; although there are 
again important differences in both 
levels and structure from one area to 
another. This general structure suggests 
that by far the majority of women view 
FEMALE LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES 
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.323 .392 .493 .478 .298 .336 
.327 .614 .556 .675 .484 ,626 
.314 .650 .252 .587 .348 .677 
.309 .739 .230 .561 .279 .676 
.348 .779 .231 .554 .349 .642 
.355 .790 .214 .505 .351 .589 
.351 .755 .183 .410 .320 .494 
.339 .711 .126 .261 .245 .292 
.244 .475 .028 .053 .056 .036 
The first three are all low-income countries 
in Africa, yet female participation rates run the 
entire gamut from extremely low in Egypt 
through moderate in Mozambique to very high 
in Ghana. The Netherlands and Denmark are 
both high-income industrialized countries of 
Northern Europe, yet rates are much higher in 
the latter (except for adolescents), just as they 
are in Finland as against Norway, although both 
are Scandinavian countries. Differences in 
statistical methods are no doubt part of the 
problem, but much more is involved. As stated 
in the text, female labour participation rates are 
clearly the result of a large number of factors, 
many of which are specific to the particular 
country or area concerned. Even within a given 
area the situation can change substantially in 
fairly short spaces of time; this is evident from 
the substantial increases in female participation 
rates which have occurred in a number of the 
high-income industrial countries in recent years. 
work outside the home not as a career, 
but rather as a transitory phase, prior to 
marriage, or the formation of a family, 
or perhaps until the male head of the 
family is more firmly established. It may 
also be linked to the type of activities 
open to women; these may be mostly 
casual, unskilled jobs offering little 
incentive to the formation of a longer-
term, career-oriented outlook. 
These are clearly broad socio-cultural 
aspects of a society, in which changes are 
difficult to project and will not necessa-
rily be closely associated with economic 
or any other limited set of variables. 
About all that can definitely be said is 
that if the role of women in society and 
their attitude to work outside the home 
should change, there could be a very 
large increase in the number of women 
in the labour force. The solution to this 
difficulty, where the simulation exercises 
are concerned, has been, as already 
noted, to select the 1968 French partici-
pation rates as a possible 'target'. In so 
far as the general environment changes, 
participation rates might move part or all 
of the way to those levels, and this is the 
sort of assumption adopted in the exerci-
ses. It must be kept in mind, however, 
that such assumptions are to a conside-
rable extent arbitrary. 
The situation with respect to male 
labour participation rates is more 
straightforward; again for the reasons 
cited earlier, only the urban rates are 
estimated (see table 22). 
By comparison with the French stan-
dard, male participation rates in Latin 
America tend to be relatively high for 
the very young (teenagers and those in 
their early twenties) and for the elderly 
(the 65-plus age group), probably reflect-
ing somewhat lower attendance ratios in 
secondary and higher educational institu-
tions, and less complete social security 
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coverage for the elderly. From the age of 
25 to the age of 50 participation rates 
tend to be quite similar to those in 
France; nearly all males are participating 
members of the labour force during 
these most active adult years. 
The divergence among countries 
occurs primarily in the 50-65 age groups. 
Male participation rates throughout this 
age range are relatively high in El Salva-
dor and Venezuela —well above the 
French rates; whereas in Argentina and 
Brazil they decline rapidly, particularly 
in the more developed regions in the two 
countries, and are well below the French 
level. 
In overall terms, while there is some 
variation in male labour participation 
rates among the different countries, this 
is much less than in the case of female 
participation rates; and the general level 
is also closer to that found in France. If 
male participation rates should move 
toward the French 'target' rates, as 
assumed in several of the simulation 
exercises, the result would be a signifi-
cant decline in the male labour force in 
El Salvador and in Venezuela, but little 
overall change in Argentina and Brazil. 
In the study of possible changes in 
labour participation rates, and the effect 
they might have on the size of the labour 
force, all these elements should be consi-
dered in combination; the total result 
may easily be quite different from that 
obtained by taking any single aspect in 
isolation. The major factor here is that 
the changes might produce opposing 
Table 22 
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trends in the male and in the female 
labour force: participation rates for 
women could rise substantially, thereby 
greatly increasing the number of women 
in the labour force, but male participa-
tion rates are more likely to decline and 
so partially offset such an increase. 
The potential overall impact of 
changes in participation rates can be 
deduced from the projections of the 
second exercise, where it is assumed that 
by the end of the century urban partici-
pation rates move to the 'target' 1968 
French level (see table 23). 
As the figures show, such changes 
would be of some importance every-
where, but there is considerable variation 
from one urban area to another. The 
weakest impact would be in El Salvador. 
Urban female participation rates are 
already relatively high in that country, 
so that a shift to the French level would 
result in only a 30 per cent increase in 
the size of the female labour force 
-substantial, but much smaller than in 
the other countries. And as the active 
population will be expanding very fast, 
the assumed change in participation rates 
accounts for a more moderate 28 per 
cent of the total projected increase in 
the female labour force. Male participa-
tion rates are also quite high in El Salva-
dor, so that assimilation to those of 
France would markedly reduce the male 
labour force, although still not very 
greatly in relation to the total projected 
increase up to the end of the century. 
Finally, since the assumed change produ-
ces opposing effects on the male and the 
female labour forces, these largely offset 
each other and the size of the labour 
force as a whole is little affected. The 
impact on the female labour force would 
be a good deal more pronounced in 
Table 23 
RELATIVE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES 
ASSUMED IN THE SECOND SIMULATION EXERCISE 
Percentage change in size of 
labour force in 2000 due to 
changes in labour 
participation rates 
Percentage of increase in 
labour force 1970-2000 due 
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Venezuela, but otherwise the situation is 
much the same as in El Salvador, and the 
overall effect would be quite moderate. 
In Argentina and Brazil the incidence 
of the assumed change would be conside-
rably greater: the female labour force 
would be much enlarged, and as male 
participation rates are lower there would 
be less of an offsetting decrease in the 
male labour force (which would actually 
increase in Brazil). As a result, the total 
labour force would increase substan-
tially, and the shift in labour participa-
tion rates would account for a sizable 
part of the projected increase in both 
countries. 
The foregoing remarks are all based 
on the assumption that by the end of the 
century labour participation rates will 
have fully reached the French levels. In 
so far as they move in that direction, but 
to a lesser degree, as assumed in other 
simulation exercises, the impact is of 
course modified, but still of the sort 
discussed here. 
The substantial variations from one 
country to another mean that this is 
another aspect which will need to be 
closely followed up to determine trends 
in any particular area. Clearly, concern 
will be primarily with female participa-
tion rates, where there is great scope for 
change in all countries, with consequent 
large potential increases in the female 
labour force, and where the factors 
which might bring about such change are 
likely to be quite specific to the area 
concerned. Possible changes in male 
labour participation rates would have a 
much smaller impact on the male labour 
force, and are more uniform and proba-
bly easier to predict. 
While possible changes in labour par-
ticipation rates are of considerable 
importance, it should again be stressed 
that they are not the major factor in the 
rapid projected growth of the labour 
force. Even in the second experiment, 
where the impact of changing participa-
tion rates is greatest, it accounts for only 
3 per cent to 29 per cent of the total 
projected increases; in the other exerci-
ses its relative importance is less. The 
paramount factor is the increase in the 
population in the active age groups. 
(iii) Trends in individual areas. The 
next aspect to be considered is where the 
aggregate increase is likely to be concen-
trated, and the probable rates of increase 
which this implies in the different areas 
of the countries analysed. Since popula-
tion growth in the active age groups is 
the major determinant of the increase in 
the labour force, the earlier observations 
on general population shifts and rates of 
total population growth in the different 
areas provide the essential background, 
and the discussion here should be read in 
that context. 
In rural-urban terms, of course, it is 
primarily the cities which will have to 
cope with the problem of adequate 
employment opportunities in the de-
cades ahead. Even if there should be 
very little rural-urban migration the bulk 
of the increase will occur in the urban 
areas. In the first exercise, where little 
migration is assumed, it is nevertheless in 
the urban areas that around 85 per cent 
of the total increase in the labour force 
to the end of the century is found in 
Argentina and Venezuela, and over two-
thirds in Brazil; only in El Salvador is the 
proportion slightly less than one-half. If 
substantial migration is assumed nearly 
all the increase will take place in the urban 
areas. Thus, in the third exercise (substan-
tia! migration but less massive than in the 
second exercise) less than one-sixth of the 
increase in the labour force is in the rural 
area even in El Salvador, and in the other 
countries the proportion is negligible. 
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In general, then, pressures for addi-
tional employment opportunities are, to 
say the least, unlikely to be rapidly 
intensified in the rural areas; but prevai-
ling conditions vary greatly. If large-scale 
migration continues labour shortages 
might possibly develop in some rural 
areas, particularly in the rural South in 
Argentina, but perhaps also in Venezuela 
or the developed rural area in Brazil; and 
in any case it is improbable that employ-
ment opportunities will be a serious 
problem here.29 In Ei Salvador or the 
less-developed rural area in Brazil, 
however, the rural employment problem 
is likely to remain of much greater 
importance. At least until 1970 the rural 
labour force was still increasing very 
rapidly in El Salvador, and moderately 
rapidly in the less-developed region of 
Brazil, and if these rates of increase 
continue, pressures for employment will 
of course be stepped up. Moreover, even 
if large-scale migration should sharply 
slow down the expansion in the coming 
decades, the pressures in such areas have 
already been built up to the point where 
they will probably remain severe for a 
long time. But it is still true that, from 
the national point of view, the employ-
ment problem will not necessarily be 
concentrated in areas like these. In El 
Salvador slightly over half of the increase 
in the labour force will occur in the rural 
areas if there is no significant migration, 
but to the extent that migration to the 
cities takes place on a larger scale, the 
problems will shift to the urban area 
even here. And in Brazil less than one-
29
 This does not mean that the problem of 
low rural incomes, or even rural poverty, will 
necessarily disappear in such areas. More or less 
adequate employment opportunities should cer-
tainly improve these conditions, but their elimi-
nation is likely to depend on other factors 
outside the scope of this study. 
fifth of the increase will be produced in 
the less-developed rural area, even if 
there is little migration; in so far as 
migration occurs the proportion will be 
still smaller. 
Setting aside the strict rural-urban 
division and thinking instead in terms of 
low-income areas, there are two such 
areas in the countries analysed which 
will probably be of major concern in this 
respect. The first, as already noted, is the 
rural area in El Salvador. If migration 
trends pursue the pattern of the recent 
past, half the labour force increment will 
be in the rural area, and even if more 
migration takes place, a significant part 
of the increase is likely to occur there 
for some years to come. The second is 
the less-developed region in Brazil, where 
if there is little migration (as in the first 
exercise), well over 40 per cent of the 
total increase in Brazil's labour force will 
originate, and well over 30 per cent even 
with large-scale migration (as in the third 
exercise). Most of this growth will take 
place in the cities of the region, but at all 
events the employment problem will 
have to be dealt with to a major extent 
within the less-developed region of the 
country. 
It is in the urban areas, however, that 
the bulk of the increase will occur, and 
as unemployment here tends to be more 
overt, and to exert greater social and 
political pressures, it is of particular 
interest to determine how fast the urban 
labour force is likely to expand. Much 
will depend on the scale of migration, 
and on how much labour participation 
rates change, and the range of possibi-
lities can be determined by examining 
the results of the first exercise (little 
change from the 1970 situation) and the 
third exercise (substantial change, but 
less extreme than the changes assumed in 
the second exercise). The relevant figures 
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from these two exercises are presented in 
table 24. 
As the figures show, with the partial 
exception of Argentina, the labour force 
in the urban areas will expand greatly 
during the 30-year period of the projec-
tions. Given the assumptions of the first 
exercise, the labour force in the urban 
South in Argentina will increase by only 
about one third, i.e., at an average rate 
of 1 per cent per annum. With the 
assumptions of the third exercise the 
increase will be about twice as large; and 
in the urban North it will be significantly 
bigger with either set of assumptions. 
Possible changes in labour participation 
rates are of considerable importance in 
the urban areas of Argentina, particu-
larly in the South. In the urban South 
fertility rates have already declined to 
quite low levels and the rate of natural 
increase in the active age groups will be 
fairly slow; and as close to two thirds of 
the labour force was already concen-
trated in the area in 1970, migration can 
no longer have such powerful impact. 
Thus, if there is no change in labour 
participation rates, the labour force in 
the urban South, with or without migra-
tion, will increase only to a fairly mode-
rate extent,30 and it is the possibility of 
a substantial increase as a result of rising 
participation rates that indues it with an 
element of flexibility; this is of conside-
rable importance in Argentina. The 
major point to note is that the increase 
in the urban labour force in Argentina 
will be fairly moderate whatever the 
assumptions made; again the situation is 
clearly differentiated from that in most 
of the rest of the region. 
30
 In the third exercise, with its assumption 
of large-scale migration, the labour force would 
increase by only about 45 per cent up to the 
end of the century if labour participation rates 
remained constant. The difference between this 
In all the other urban areas considered 
the increase in the labour force will 
be much bigger. Even if there is no 
large-scale migration the labour force at 
the end of the century will be about 
2 2fa times its 1970 size in the less-
developed urban area in Brazil, and the 
range then stretches upward to 3 '/" 
times the 1970 size in the urban area in 
El Salvador. If there is substantial rural-
urban migration, which has been the case 
in most regions in the past and is likely 
to be in the future, the increases will be 
still larger. In the projections of the third 
exercise the urban labour forces increase 
to around 3 l ¡i times their 1970 size by 
the end of the century, except in El 
Salvador, where the corresponding figure 
is 4.8 times. As can be seen from the 
table, although there is some variation, 
such figures imply that up to the end of 
the century urban labour forces can be 
expected to increase at rates ranging 
around 4 per cent per annum. 
Such rates are extremely high, and 
virtually ensure that the problem of urban 
employment will remain a central con-
cern in most of the region at least until 
the end of the century.31 Nevertheless, 
it is very important to note that, in one 
figure and the 63 per cent increase shown in the 
table reflects the impact of the assumed 
changes in participation rates. 
31
 The difficulty of absorbing an increase 
of this magnitude in a modern, urban-oriented 
pattern of industrial development can be illus-
trated by referring again to favourable post-
World War II experiences. In 1955-1970, a 
period during which Japan's gross product 
increased at an average rate of close to 11 per 
cent per annum, employment increased at 
annual rates of 3 per cent in the industrial 
sector and 3.9 per cent in the industrial and 
services sectors combined. In Italy and West 
Germany, where the gross product increased at 
around 6 per cent per annum during the period, 
employment in the industrial and services 
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Table 24 
PROJECTED INCREASES IN THE LABOUR FORCE IN 
SELECTED URBAN AREAS, 1970 TO 2000 
Size of the labour 




Actual rates of increase, 
1965-1970 
(per cent per annum) 





















































































sense, the period of maximum pressure 
has already passed in many of the urban 
areas of Latin America. As table 24 
shows, in most of them the rate of 
increase in the later 1960s was higher 
than that projected for the decades 
sectors combined increased at annual rates of 
2.4 per cent and 1.8 per cent, respectively. 
Such past experience indicates that modern-
type industrial expansion, even when very 
rapid, tends to be achieved with only moderate 
increases in employment in the high-
productivity sectors. 
ahead. Thus the pressure for employ-
ment, in so far as the growth rate of the 
labour force is an adequate measure of 
it, can be expected to ease in many 
urban areas. 
The reason for this slower rate of 
increase is again linked to the extent to 
which the shift to the cities has already 
occurred, and has been analysed earlier 
in relation to the population as a whole. 
A more precise appreciation of the 
labour force situation would require esti-
mates which take into account past 
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changes in urban labour participation 
rates, and these have not been made. 
With that margin of uncertainty, it is 
nevertheless clear that the period of 
most rapid expansion of the urban 
labour force in Venezuela occurred 
during the 1950s; although still very 
high, the rate of increase has already 
fallen from that peak level and can be 
expected to decline further in the decades 
ahead. The same general pattern is 
characteristic of Argentina and Brazil, 
although the fluctuations have been 
more moderate, and, in Brazil, the 
period of most rapid increase was also 
more recent.32 
The only urban area considered 
where that period manifestly lies ahead 
is El Salvador's. Rural-urban migration in 
that country has been limited, and has 
not been a major factor in the increase in 
the urban labour force in recent years. 
Even apart from migration the urban 
labour force will tend to increase some-
what faster in the years ahead as a result 
of population growth in the active age 
groups; and if substantial migration to 
the cities should begin, the increase, as 
shown by the figures in the table, could 
be very rapid indeed. 
But although the growth rate of the 
labour force is very important, it is not 
the only determinant of the pressure for 
employment opportunities. A further 
basic factor is the prevailing situation: 
that is, how much pressure has already 
been built up. If the past very rapid 
increase in the urban labour force has led 
M
 There are also important regional diffe-
rences in these countries. The period of most 
rapid increase has passed in most urban areas; 
the possible exception is the less-developed 
urban region of Brazil, where the already rapid 
expansion might speed up temporarily if migra-
tion should increase. 
to a situation where a large pool of 
unemployed or under-employed has 
already been formed, a slowing of the 
rate of increase may mean only that the 
pool of under-employed will expand less 
rapidly; it will not necessarily shrink, 
and so the pressures for employment will 
not necessarily diminish. The number of 
unemployed will decline only if new 
employment opportunities are created 
faster than the labour force is increasing, 
and since the labour force will continue 
to increase very quickly in most urban 
areas, this will be difficult to achieve. 
The magnitude of existing pressures 
could well be the main consideration in 
such circumstances, and this is one of 
the critical aspects of the transition from 
a basically rural to a basically urban 
population structure. The transition has 
tended to be a rapid one in many coun-
tries, involving mass migration which for 
a 20-to-30-year period has produced a 
galloping increase in the urban labour 
force. If the urban economic structure 
has been sufficiently dynamic and flexi-
ble to cope with this influx (although 
severe problems are unlikely to have 
been avoided even in the best of circums-
tances), the passing of the transition 
period will bring lower rates of increase 
and the urban employment problem may 
become more manageable. If, on the 
other hand, the transitional influx has 
tended to overwhelm the urban econo-
my, the passing of the transition period 
and a slower growth rate of the labour 
force may not, in itself, generate any 
fundamental change. Such conditions 
probably vary widely from one extreme 
to the other in the different urban areas 
of the region. 
Another aspect of the passing of the 
transitional phase is the effect this will 
have on the composition of the urban 
labour force. The very high rates of 
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increase in the recent past in many urban 
areas are a reflection of the large influx 
of rural workers. Rural migrants have 
probably often accounted for one-third 
to one-half of the increment in the urban 
labour force, and workers with a still 
limited experience of urban life have 
formed a sizable proportion of the urban 
total. As the period of transition passes 
migrants will be of declining importance 
and the situation will change. New 
entrants in the urban labour force will 
increasingly be dominated by those who 
were born, or at least have grown up, in 
the cities, and those with limited expe-
rience of urban life will no longer consti-
tute a substantial part of the total labour 
force. Expectations, and responses, may 
well change in these altered circumstan-
ces, and the pressures for adequate 
employment opportunities may take 
somewhat different forms. 
A final aspect of the growth of the 
labour force worth noting is that it often 
differs significantly from the growth of 
the population as a whole. This results to 
a large extent from changing age struct-
ures. As was pointed out earlier, the 
transition to higher rates of population 
growth, which occurred in may countries 
in the 1940s, initially tended to cause a 
sharp increase in the number of children, 
and this bulge then began working its 
way gradually through the different age 
groups, with corresponding changes in 
the age structure. The downturn in ferti-
lity rates, too, as far as it goes, produces 
changes in the age structure. In the 
individual areas within a country migra-
tion can cause further shifts, as it affects 
particularly the very young; and, finally, 
changes in labour participation rates ian 
cause labour force trends to diverge from 
those of the population asa whole, parti-
cularly in the urban areas. The possible 
extent of such divergence can be quite 
substantial, as illustrated by results from 
the projections of the first and the third 
simulation exercise (see table 25). 
In Argentina, the labour force of the 
country as a whole increases marginally 
less than the total population in the first 
exercise (little change from the 1970 
situation), but in all the other countries 
it increases more, even in this exercise; in 
the third exercise, with substantial 
assumed changes, its growth rate is 
higher than that of the population in all 
countries, and the divergence is much 
greater. In area terms there are also signi-
ficant differences, and considerable 
variation from one area to another; in 
particular, the labour force in some rural 
areas may increase less than the popula-
tion, while the relation is reversed in the 
cities. 
One implication of these divergences 
is simply that population trends are 
often a poor indicator for estimating 
changes in the labour force. In most 
countries of the region the labour force 
probably increased a good deal less 
rapidly than the population as a whole 
from around 1940 to the mid-1950s, 
whereas since about 1960 the relation-
ship has been reversed. This sort of 
situation is important as it is one factor 
in the emerging employment problem. 
Comparative trends in the individual 
areas are more complex and there is even 
more need to keep such possible diver-
gences in mind. 
A second implication is that such 
divergences reflect shifts in activity rates 
(total labour participation rates),33 and 
thus affect trends in per capita income 
levels, quite apart from changes in levels 
33
 Activity rates, defined as the ratio of the 
total labour force to the total population, are 
of course nothing more than a measure of the 
concept under discussion. 
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of productivity. There was a good deal 
of variation in activity rates in 1970, and 
as the above discussion indicates they 
may change substantially in the decades 
ahead. Illustrative figures for 1970 and 
2000 with the projections of the third 
simulation exercise are shown in table 
26. 
Argentina again stands apart, with 
the activity rate at a considerably higher 
level in 1970. The total figures for the 
other countries are quite similar, but 
within Brazil (as to a lesser extent within 
Argentina) there is a good deal of diffe-
rence along regional lines, with the 
activity rate in the more developed 
region distinctly higher. These higher 
activity rates in Argentina (and in the 
more developed regions) mean that per 
capita incomes in those areas will be 
bigger, even apart from possible diffe-
rences in productivity per member of the 
labour force; in effect, a given volume of 
production per worker is shared with a 
smaller number of inactive persons. 
With the assumptions of the third 
exercise activity rates everywhere will 
rise substantially, and in general the dis-
parities will be reduced. Part of the rise 
is the result of the very rapid increase in 
the labour force which will occur in 
most of the region, and this poses the 
vital problem of adequate employment 
opportunities. But a further major factor 
is the less rapid growth of the non-active 
population, and this can be an important 
factor in raising per capita incomes; it is 
the relatively immediate economic bene-
fit that results from a decline in fertility 
rates. 
Changes of this sort can be of consi-
derable importance. From around 1940 
to the mid-1950s total activity rates pro-
bably fell significantly in many countries 
of the region, and this tended to hold 
down the increase in per capita incomes; 
Table 25 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: PROJECTED SIZE OF THE 
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Table 26 





























that is, given the improvement in pro-
ductivity per member of the labour force 
which occurred, there was a smaller 
increase in per capita incomes because 
the number of inactive persons per mem-
ber of the labour force was rising. The 
reversal of this trend probably began 
around 1960 in much of the region, and 
in the projections of the third simulation 
takes a sharply opposite turn. With the 
rise in activity rates shown, even if there 
were no increase in productivity per 
member of the labour force, per capita 
incomes would rise by well over 20 per 
cent by the end of the century in Brazil 
and Venezuela, for example. 
(iv) Changes in the structure of the 
labour force. In addition to the changes 
in size, there are likely to be major chan-
ges in the structure of the labour force in 
most of the region. The most important 
of these is the continuing shift toward a 
predominantly urban labour force. Its 
nature and significance has already been 
analysed above, and all that is necessary 
here is to emphasize the extent to which 
the labour force in the region is likely to 
be urban by the end of the century. In 
1970 the great bulk of it was already 
urban in the more highly developed 
regions of Argentina and Brazil, and in 
Venezuela; but a major proportion of 
the total was still rural in the other 
regions of Brazil and in El Salvador. 
Even with the assumption of little change 
in the first exercise there is a steady 
rise in the relative importance of the 
urban labour force everywhere, and if 
substantial migration continues the shift 
will of course be much greater. Given the 
assumptions of the third exercise, over 
two-thirds of the labour force will be 
urban at the end of the century in El 
Salvador, and the proportion rises to 
well over 90 per cent in the more 
developed regions of Argentina and 
Brazil (see table 27). 
A second major change which is 
likely to occur relates to the structure of 
the labour force by sex. In 1970 males 
heavily dominated the labour force 
everywhere, but the relative importance 
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of women will probably increase in the 
decades ahead. To some extent this 
aspect of the changing structure of the 
labour force is linked to the rural-urban 
shift: since in the rural areas the propor-
tion of the labour force formed by male 
workers (generally around 90 per cent of 
the total) is larger than in the cities, the 
movement to the urban areas will itself 
tend to increase the relative importance 
of women in the labour force as a whole. 
But most of the prospective change here 
will occur to the extent that labour par-
ticipation rates shift toward Western 
European levels. As was discussed earlier, 
such a shift could result in a very large 
increase in the number of working 
women, whereas the number of active 
males would be more likely to decline, 
and the structure of the labour force 
would change accordingly. The extent of 
the change which might occur is indica-
ted in the projections of the third 
exercise (see table 28). Males will still 
constitute around 70 per cent of the 
total labour force in the different coun-
tries -and about two-thirds in the urban 
areas- but the projected shift is never-
theless quite substantial. 
Finally, notable changes in the age 
structure of the labour force are also 
likely. In 1970 the labour force in Latin 
America was a very young one: young 
adults accounted for about half of the 
total, and teenagers for a further 15-20 
per cent. The proportion of older to 
younger workers was therefore rather 
low, and this may have significant impli-
cations: on the one hand, a young labour 
force has obvious advantages in that 
young workers are more flexible and 
more easily trained, qualities which in a 
rapidly changing economic structure can 
be of considerable value; on the other 
hand, the older but still fully active 
members of the labour force are apt to 
Table 27 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOUR 
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Table 28 
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS: PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION 



























































be more stable and more experienced; 
and as the economy becomes more com-
plex - in particular as the industrial 
sector expands- these aspects of the 
question are likely to carry increasing 
weight. In the high-income industrial 
countries the balance between the two 
large adult age groups is much more even 
(in France in 1968, for example, young 
adults formed about 46 per cent of the 
labour force and the older active adult 
group 42 per cent) and this will probably 
be a factor of some importance. 
Within the region labour force age 
structures already varied considerably in 
1970, and, as noted, are likely to change 
further in the years to come. They also 
vary a great deal within each country, 
both by area and by sex, and the natio-
nal aggregates, and changes in those 
aggregates, may not be very meaningful 
unless this is taken into account. The 
1970 figures for these different grou-
pings are shown in table 29, along with 
the end-of-the-century results from the 
projections of the third exercise, to give 
an idea of the sort of changes likely to 
occur. 
At the national level young adults 
are of similar relative importance in all 
countries; the differences tend to be con-
centrated more in the relative importan-
ce of teenagers and the active older adult 
group. Again Argentina stands apart, this 
time because the labour force is not as 
young as in the other countries, with the 
proportion of more experienced older 
adults substantially larger. In area terms 
the proportion of teenagers is higher in 
the rural labour force, and in general in 
the less highly developed regions, but 
particular patterns of migration flows 
can have an important and varying 
impact on age structures. 
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Finally, the female labour force is 
much younger than the male labour 
force, and a somewhat different age 
classification would make this contrast 
still greater; within the young adult 
labour force women tend to be much 
more heavily concentrated in the first 
half of the age range (20-29) than men. 
As the age structure of the popula-
tion as a whole gradually changes and 
—more important in the decades imme-
diately ahead- to the extent that labour 
participation rates shift toward Western 
European levels, labour force age struc-
tures will themselves alter. While in 
general the labour force can be expected 
to be somewhat more mature, and 
experienced, at the end of the century, 
there are substantial differences in 
respect of how and how far this is likely 
to occur. 
With the projections of the third 
exercise the changes in the rural areas are 
quite small, but too much importance 
should not be attached to these 
figures.34 Perhaps the most significant 
rural change is the consistent rise in the 
relative importance of the over-65 group 
in the labour force, caused by the 
draining away of the more active age 
groups through migration. 
The changes in all the other groups 
are much more substantial. The greatest 
shift occurs in the structure of the urban 
female labour force, where the move-
34
 As has been pointed out before, labour 
participation rates in the rural areas are proba-
bly less meaningful than those in the urban 
areas, and little or no change in them has been 
assumed in the third exercise. The changes 
shown in the table therefore reflect changes in 
the structure of the population as a whole, 
which in its turn can be greatly influenced by 
migration; and here too caution must be used 
because of the way in which migration is 
treated in the model. 
ment of labour participation rates 
towards the Western European levels is 
the primary factor in producing a 
sharp decline in the relative importance 
of teenagers and a counterbalancing 
increase in that of active adults, usually 
concentrated in the more mature adult 
group. At the end of the century the age 
structure of the female labour force 
much more closely resembles that of the 
male labour force. The male labour force 
itself changes in a similar way, but to a 
much lesser extent. And of course the 
shift in the total urban labour force, 
being the sum of the male and female 
age structures, is also of the same nature. 
But as aggregation proceeds a diver-
gence between the different countries 
becomes increasingly clear, and at the 
total national level is quite marked. In all 
the countries analysed the labour force 
becomes somewhat more mature, but 
the sense in which this is true varies from 
one country to another. In Argentina the 
age structure of the labour force shifts 
manifestly closer to that characterizing 
the high-income industrial countries: the 
relative importance of teenagers declines, 
and this is offset by an increase in that 
of the more mature but still fully active 
adult age group, which was already of 
considerably greater relative importance 
than in the other countries considered. 
In these other countries the relative 
importance of teenagers also decreases, 
but the offsetting gain appears to a much 
greater extent in the young adult age 
group. In Brazil the relative increase is 
somewhat greater in the more experi-
enced adult group, and so the change is 
more similar to that in Argentina, but in 
El Salvador and in Venezuela the relative 
increase is heavily concentrated in the 
young adult group. 
As a consequence, at the end of the 
century Argentina is further removed 
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from the other countries in this respect 
than was the ca'Se in 1970; the proportion 
of the labour force accounted for by teen-
agers and young adults is much lower in 
Argentina, while the proportion of older, 
more experienced, workers is much tougher 
than in the other countries. The basic 
explanation is again the earlier beginning 
of the population transition. It will not be 
until the next century that a similar evolu-
tion can lead to a corresponding maturing 
of the labour force in the other countries. 
